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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
China’s economy is expanding rapidly, and the emerging powerhouse is searching for 
energy resources, raw materials, and markets to maintain its economic growth.  China has shown 
an insatiable appetite for Latin America’s natural resources, commodities, and agricultural 
products, from oil to lumber to copper to soybeans.  Trade values between the two regions 
increased greatly from $1.3 billion in 1980 to $12 billion in 2000 to about $50 billion in 2005.  
Latin America has the raw materials that China needs to fuel its economic expansion and offers a 
large market for cheap Chinese manufactured goods.   
Many analysts claim that Sino-Latin American trade is a “match made in trade heaven,” 
contending that China’s demand for raw materials is primarily a positive demand shock.  China’s 
demand for resources and raw materials has pushed up prices in the world market, benefiting the 
Latin American countries exporting these goods.  Chile, Venezuela, and Peru registered record 
trade surpluses in 2004 and 2005 due to the surge in exports to China.  Others have noted that 
with a population of 1.3 billion, China offers a huge market for Latin American exports. 
On the other hand, many of the issues addressed by the Latin American dependency 
theorists of the 1960’s and 1970’s are relevant to current Sino-Latin American trade patterns.  
Dependency theory is best understood as a framework that seeks to explain underdevelopment in 
Latin America in terms of external causes.  According to dependency theorists, the world is 
divided into “core” and “periphery.”  The core is composed of the advanced countries, and the 
periphery is made up of the underdeveloped poor countries.  The periphery is confined to 
exporting primary products and natural resources to the core, while the core exports 
manufactured goods to the periphery.  Dependency theorists argued that this reliance on primary 
product exports is not conducive to economic growth since the periphery will suffer from 
deteriorating terms of trade.  In other words, the poorer countries would be able to import less 
and less for a given level of exports.   
In this paper, I first discuss the ideas of the prominent dependency theorists of the 1960’s 
and 1970’s, the main propositions and criticisms of dependency theory, and the currency of 
dependency theory.  Next, I outline the history of Sino-Latin American trade relations and 
describe current Sino-Latin American trade patterns.  In the case study section, I focus 
specifically on the very different trade relations China has with Brazil and Mexico.  Then, I 
provide data regarding Sino-Latin American trade.  Lastly, I evaluate the extent to which Sino-
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Latin American trade relations resemble a dependent relationship.  Results suggest that several 
Latin American countries are being pushed into a “raw materials corner,” and that many of the 
trade-related aspects of dependency theory are relevant to current Sino-Latin American trade 
relations. 
 
PART TWO: DEPENDENCY THEORY 
 
I. Introduction 
Dependency theory emerged in Latin America in the late 1950’s in response to concerns 
raised by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).  The group 
found that economic growth in the advanced industrialized nations did not necessarily lead to 
growth in the poorer nations.  As a result of these studies, dependency theory developed and rose 
to prominence in the 1960’s and 1970’s.  
There is no unified dependency theory, and there are still points of disagreement among 
dependency theorists.  Ronaldo Munck said, “It [dependency] can mean quite different things to 
different people in different contexts” (59).  Dependency theory is best understood as a family of 
approaches or a framework that seeks to explain underdevelopment in Latin America and other 
developing nations in terms of external causes.  Theotonio Dos Santos, a Brazilian dependency 
theorist, defined dependency as: 
An historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it 
favors some countries to the detriment of others, and limits the development possibilities 
of the subordinate economies…a situation in which the economy of certain countries is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former 
is subjected.  The relation of inter-dependence between two or more economies, and 
between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries 
(the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the 
dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either 
a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.  (“Structure” 231) 
Dependency ideas were pervasive in Latin American centers of academia, but also gained 
adherents in Europe and the United States.  Dependency theory was held to be a distinctively 
Latin American analysis of Latin American development (Sánchez 1).  The dependency writers 
were primarily Latin American and they focused chiefly on Latin American countries.  Dos 
Santos said that the development of dependency theory “gave rise to a privileged moment in the 
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history of social ideas in Latin America” (“Theoretical Foundations” 54).  Munck called the 
Latin American dependency approach “probably one of the most significant interventions of a 
Third World discourse in a Western paradigm in the whole post-colonial era” (56). 
 In this section, I review the main ideas of some of the prominent dependency theorists of 
the 1960’s and 1970’s including Raúl Prebisch, André Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, 
Theotonio Dos Santos, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso.  Next, I discuss the basic theoretical 
propositions that are shared by most dependency theorists, and I then highlight some of the 
criticisms of dependency theory.  Lastly, I summarize “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation,” a recent article by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, 
and James A. Robinson that discusses aspects of dependency theory that are still relevant today.  
This section provides the foundation needed to later evaluate the extent to which Sino-Latin 
American trade relations resemble a dependent relationship.  In this evaluation, I adopt the more 
trade-related aspects of dependency theory, especially those postulated by Raúl Prebisch, and 
focus less on the social and political aspects. 
 
II. The Dependency Theorists 
 
Raúl Prebisch 
Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch headed the ECLA from 1948 until 1962.  In the late 
1950’s, the commission was troubled when it learned that economic growth in the developed 
industrialized countries did not necessarily lead to growth in Latin America and the developing 
countries.  The ECLA studies suggested that economic activity in the advanced countries often 
led to economic problems in the poorer nations.  This was inconsistent with neoclassical 
economic theory, which claimed that economic growth was beneficial to all (Pareto superior) 
even if the benefits were not always shared equally (Ferraro 1).   
Prebisch developed an explanation: poor countries, like those in Latin America, exported 
mostly commodities and raw materials to the advanced countries.  The more advanced countries 
then manufactured products from those commodities and raw materials and sold them back to the 
poorer nations.  Using United Nations data, Prebisch showed that the exchange between primary 
products and manufactures led to a deterioration in Latin America’s terms of trade: prices of 
agricultural products and raw materials tended to fall while prices of manufactured products 
tended to remain constant or rise (“Theoretical Foundations” 54).  Hans Singer, a German 
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economist, also recognized Latin America’s excessive reliance on exports of primary products 
and raw materials.  Both economists are co-credited for formulating the Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis which postulates that the terms of trade for commodity exporters tend to deteriorate 
over time (Sánchez 4).  Therefore, the poorer countries would be able to import less and less for 
a given level of exports.  The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis suggests that reliance on primary 
product exports is not conducive to economic growth. 
The ECLA and Prebisch also argued that the world economy was divided into the 
industrial “center” (the United States and Europe) and the commodity-producing “periphery.”  
The countries that exported primary products would experience deteriorating terms of trade, and 
the center would consistently exploit the periphery; the rich would get richer, and the poor would 
get poorer.  Participation in world trade was therefore a losing proposition for Latin America and 
developing countries.  International trade was not a way to improve standards of living, but 
rather a form of exploitation committed by the industrial center (Yergin and Stanislaw 233).  
Thus, Prebisch and the ECLA linked Latin American underdevelopment to the international 
economic system, and this concept is one of the key tenets of dependency theory.     
 As a result of Prebisch’s findings, the ECLA began to emphasize Latin America’s need 
for autonomous, self-sustaining development.  Rather than exporting commodities and importing 
finished goods, Latin America and the countries of the periphery moved towards import 
substitution industrialization (ISI).  High tariff walls were erected to reduce the region’s 
dependence on foreign manufactures, industrialization was accelerated, and many industries 
were nationalized (Yergin and Stanislaw 235).  In an interview for the PBS series Commanding 
Heights, Moises Naim, editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy magazine, explained how import 
substitution came about: 
Latin American exports were essentially raw materials and minerals.  In exchange for that 
they imported tractors and cars and television sets and refrigerators.  They saw the prices 
of the things that they were importing were increasing each year much more than the 
prices of the raw materials they exported, and they said, ‘Unless we start developing our 
own industries, we will always be condemned to exporting goods very cheap on process, 
without a lot of value-added in exchange for the sophisticated manufactured goods.  So 
we need to move to an economy that instead of being based on agriculture and minerals is 
based on industry.  The only way for us to compete with those imports is by limiting the 
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imports and therefore forcing our consumers to buy manufactured goods made in this 
country.’ (“Up for Debate” 4) 
This new model of development soon ran into harsh criticism which will be discussed later. 
 
André Gunder Frank 
 Prebisch analyzed Latin American dependency from a structuralist and policy-oriented 
perspective.  Economist André Gunder Frank, on the other hand, adopted some Marxian ideas in 
his approach to dependency theory.  Frank affirmed that it is capitalism, both world and national, 
which produced underdevelopment in the past and which generates underdevelopment in the 
present.  He vehemently rejected the dualist model that many other economists and theorists 
applied to Latin America.  Dualism asserts that the economy of an underdeveloped country is 
divided into two essentially independent sectors.  One sector has been affected by economic 
relations with the outside capitalist world, and as a result is modern, developed, progressive, and 
capitalist.  The other “backward” or “traditional” sector is regarded as isolated, subsistence-
based, archaic, feudal, underdeveloped, and essentially uninfluenced by capitalism.  
Development then requires a transfer of resources from the feudal sector to the capitalist sector 
and a modernization of the “backward” sector (Brewer 161).  Frank rejected the dualist model in 
“The Development of Underdevelopment” when he said: 
I believe on the contrary that the entire ‘dual society’ thesis is false…The expansion of 
the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and entirely penetrated even the 
apparently most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world…The contemporary 
underdeveloped institutions of the so-called backward or feudal domestic areas of an 
underdeveloped country are no less the product of the single historical process of 
capitalist development than are the so-called capitalist institutions of the supposedly more 
progressive areas. (19) 
Frank demonstrated with factual and historical information that no part of Latin America has 
been uninfluenced by capitalism.   
 Frank also made a distinction between underdevelopment and undevelopment.  The latter 
refers to the state of affairs before capitalist penetration.  He states that “the now developed 
countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped” (18).  This 
distinction is important because it means that underdevelopment is not some original or 
traditional stage of history.  Frank rejected the notion that economic development occurs in a 
succession of capitalist stages and that today’s underdeveloped nations are still in a stage through 
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which the now developed countries passed long ago (18).  The underdeveloped countries cannot 
simply follow a process of development similar to that followed by the now developed countries 
because the present-day underdeveloped countries have always been dominated by and 
dependent upon the major capitalist powers (Ray 5).  Development does not occur in a 
succession of stages through which an underdeveloped society transitions to a modern developed 
society.  This critique is one of the most important features of dependency theory (Angotti 126).  
 Frank centered his analysis on the metropolis-satellite structure of the capitalist system.  
He explained that “contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past 
and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now 
developed metropolitan countries” (18).  The metropoles exploit the satellites so that surplus is 
concentrated in the metropoles.  On a world scale, capitalism produces a developing metropolis 
and an underdeveloped periphery.  This same process occurs within nations between a domestic 
metropolis (for example, a capital city) and the surrounding satellite regions.  In other words, 
metropolis-satellite relations are found within countries and in the world system (Chilcote 13).  
Thus, “a whole chain of constellations of metropoles and satellites relates all parts of the whole 
system from its metropolitan center in Europe or the United States to the farthest outpost in the 
Latin American countryside” (Frank 20).  This idea of a chain of metropolis-satellite relations is 
perhaps one of Frank’s most distinctive contributions to dependency theory. 
 Most important, the satellite finds itself in a state of dependency.  Politically, the ruling 
class in a dependent country is enmeshed in a chain of exchange relations, and its position 
depends on maintaining that chain; therefore, the local ruling class wishes to perpetuate 
underdevelopment.  The satellite is also dependent because even a “nationalist” government 
cannot successfully promote development due to the constraints that are imposed by the 
metropoles (Brewer 177).  The development of the satellites is limited by their dependent status.  
Frank stated, “The satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their 
most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to their metropolis are 
weakest” (25).  He explained that Latin America experienced its greatest growth during the Great 
Depression and the World Wars when its ties with Europe and the United States weakened.  
Frank asserted that the most underdeveloped regions are those which were most closely linked to 
the metropolis (Chilcote 13). 
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 André Gunder Frank made several important contributions to dependency theory.  
Almost all dependency theorists acknowledge that dependency involves metropolis-satellite 
relations, though some may label the relationship differently (for example, core-periphery or 
dominant-dependent).  Most dependency theorists also reject the dualist model and recognize 
that underdeveloped countries cannot simply follow the same path of development as the now 
developed countries.  Lastly, several dependency theorists agree with Frank that the ruling 
classes in the dependent states maintain a dependent relationship because their own interests 
coincide with the interests of the dominant state. 
 
Immanuel Wallerstein 
 Immanuel Wallerstein, an American sociologist and historical social scientist, developed 
the world system theory in his three-volume work The Modern World System.  He insisted that 
any social system must be seen as a totality.  He wrote: 
We take the defining characteristic of a social system to be the existence within it of a 
division of labour, such that the various sectors or areas within are dependent upon 
economic exchange with others for the smooth and continuous provisioning of the needs 
of the area. (Brewer 165)  
According to Wallerstein, a world system does not necessarily have to cover the globe; it is 
defined as “a unit with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems” (Brewer 165).  
The modern world system is capitalist, so the primary unit of analysis is the capitalist world 
economy.  All phenomena should be explained in terms of their consequences for both the whole 
of the system and its parts (Petras 148).   
 The world system theory attempts to explain why there are different stages of national 
development within what seems to be a unified global economy.  Wallerstein said that the key to 
explaining this phenomenon is to specify the different political and economic roles which a 
country plays within the overall system.  In other words, the world as a whole must be 
considered in order to understand development within its parts.  This gives rise to the basic 
categories of analysis of the capitalist world system: core, semi-periphery and periphery.  The 
main difference between these categories is the strength of the state in different areas.  These 
differences in strength lead to transfers of surplus from the periphery to the core, which further 
strengthen the core countries (Brewer 165).  The central theme of the world system theory is the 
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idea that the core regions exploit the peripheral areas through several mechanisms of unequal 
exchange.   
 Wallerstein explained that the world economy developed a core with flourishing 
manufacturing, technologically progressive agriculture, high investment, and skilled and well-
paid labor.  The core, however, needed the periphery from which it extracted the surplus that 
fueled expansion.  The peripheral countries produced important primary goods while technology 
stagnated, labor remain unskilled or became less skilled, and capital was withdrawn toward the 
core.  Initially, the differences between the core and the periphery were small, but the core 
expanded the gap by buying cheap primary products in exchange for manufactured goods (Chirot 
and Hall 85).  In addition to the core and periphery, a semi-periphery exists.  The semi-
peripheries are good places for investment and they deflect the anger and revolutionary activities 
of the periphery.  Wallerstein said that the semi-periphery is necessary for the capitalist world 
system to function.  Without the semi-periphery, a world system becomes polarized and is liable 
to revolt; the semi-periphery can diffuse antagonisms.  The semi-periphery also constitutes a site 
for change.  New core nations may rise from the semi-periphery, and some semi-peripheral 
countries may fall into the periphery (Brewer 166). 
 Wallerstein contributed greatly to dependency theory by analyzing underdevelopment in 
terms of the development of a world system.  As a result, dependency theorists recognize the 
necessity of thinking about the global context even if they are studying a very local phenomenon.  
Wallerstein also placed more emphasis than Frank on the role of the state, and he introduced the 
concept of semi-periphery. 
 
Theotonio Dos Santos 
 Brazilian sociologists Theotonio Dos Santos and Fernando Henrique Cardoso made their 
distinct contributions to dependency theory by presenting a typology of underdevelopment.  
According to Dos Santos: 
The relations of dependence to which these [Latin American] countries are subjected 
conform to a type of international and internal structure which leads them to 
underdevelopment or more precisely to a dependent structure that deepens and aggravates 
the fundamental problems of their peoples. (“Structure” 231) 
Dos Santos viewed the internal situation of Latin American countries as part of the world 
economy.  Similar to Frank, Dos Santos rejected the traditional theory of development which 
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attempts to explain underdevelopment in Latin America as a product of the region’s failure or 
slowness to adopt the patterns and policies of the developed countries.  Instead, dependency 
theory perceives underdevelopment as a result of and part of the process of the world expansion 
of capitalism (Dos Santos, “Structure” 231). 
 Dos Santos claimed that types of dependency are identifiable through periods of history.  
Colonial dependency explains the relations between Europeans and the colonies whereby “a 
monopoly of trade complemented a monopoly of land, mines and manpower in the colonized 
countries” (Chilcote 15).  Financial-industrial dependency occurred at the end of the 19th century.  
This type of dependency was characterized by the domination of capital in the hegemonic centers 
and investment in the peripheral colonies in the production of raw materials and agricultural 
products for consumption by the center.  As a result, a rigid specialized productive structure 
emerged in the dependent countries devoted to the export of primary products.  A “new 
dependency” based on investment by multinational corporations emerged after World War II.  
Multinational corporations began investing in industries geared to the internal markets of the 
underdeveloped countries, and Dos Santos labeled this technological-industrial dependency 
(“Structure” 232).  Dos Santos said that these forms of dependency affected not only 
international relations, but also the internal structures of these countries. 
 According to Dos Santos, the new or technological-industrial dependency limits the 
economic development of Latin America.  Industrial development in Latin America is dependent 
on exports which generate the foreign currency that is necessary to buy imported capital goods.  
Exports are usually tied to traditional sectors of the economy, which are typically controlled by 
oligarchies.  Often, these oligarchies are tied to foreign capital and remit their high profits 
abroad.  Industrial development, therefore, is conditioned by fluctuations in the balance of 
payments, “which in dependent countries often leads to deficits caused by trade relations in a 
highly monopolized international market, the repatriation of foreign profits, and the need to rely 
on foreign capital and aid” (Chilcote 16).   
Unlike Prebisch, who was a strong proponent of import substitution industrialization, Dos 
Santos did not believe import substitution had the desired consequences for spurring 
development.  It did not bring autonomy of decision making, because industrialization was 
determined mainly by foreign investment based on multinational corporations whose power was 
located in the centers of the world economy.  Import substitution did not bring improved income 
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distribution, because “oligopolistic capitalism” tended to concentrate power and wealth in groups 
of businesses with related interests.  Also, improved technology raised the incomes of skilled 
workers, laborers, and managers, but not those of the unskilled, producing greater differentiation 
of income among workers (Dos Santos, “Theoretical Foundations” 55).  In other words, as Latin 
America followed its policy of import substitution industrialization, the region became even 
more dependent on the industrialized center. 
Lastly, Dos Santos recognized the political implications of Latin American dependency.  
Underdeveloped countries face a choice between “dependent capitalism” or “popular 
revolutionary governments which open the way to socialism.”  He stated that “intermediate 
solutions have proved to be, in such a contradictory reality, empty and utopian” (“Structure” 
236).  In other words, a break from international capitalism was seen as the prerequisite for 
development in Latin America.  This idea was adopted by many radical dependency theorists in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s. 
 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
 Sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso rejected both the formalism of the empirical 
measurers of dependency and those who tried to construct an overarching theory of dependency 
applicable to all situations.  Instead, he sought to develop a methodology to understand the 
various situations of dependency in Latin America.  For Cardoso, the dependency approach was 
a critical historical-structural focus on capital expansion and class conflicts as a socio-political 
process (Munck 59).  He wrote: 
So, the analysis of structural dependency aims to explain the interrelationships of classes 
and nation-states at the level of the international scene as well as at the level internal to 
each country.  Dialectical analysis of that complex process includes formulation of 
concepts linked to the effort to explain how internal and external processes of political 
domination relate one to the other.  It cannot be conceived as if considerations of external 
factors or foreign domination were enough to explain the dynamic of societies.  The real 
question lies in the interrelationships at both levels. (Cardoso and Faletto xviii) 
Internal structure is important in Cardoso’s dependency approach.  He stressed that dependency 
is perpetuated by the various ties among groups and classes both between and within nations.  
Dependency, therefore, is not concerned only with the external, but also with politics and 
internal forces.   
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Cardoso firmly believed that dependency relations could well lead to development or 
“dependent development.”  He explained that even when peripheral economies are no longer 
restricted to the production of raw materials, they remain dependent in a specific way.  Their 
capital-goods production sectors are not financially or technologically strong enough to ensure 
continuous advance of the system.  In order to continue with economic expansion, a dependent 
country must play “the interdependency game, but in a position similar to the client who 
approaches a banker” (Cardoso and Faletto xxii).  The peripheral countries then expand and 
industrialize, but become financially dependent on the center.  This notion of dependent 
development is similar to Dos Santos’s concept of “new dependency” or “technological-
industrial dependency.” 
By pointing to the existence of a process of dependent development, Cardoso made a 
double criticism.  First, he criticized those who expect permanent stagnation in underdeveloped 
countries because of their dependent status.  Second, he criticized those who expect capitalistic 
development in peripheral countries to solve problems like distribution of property, full 
employment, improved income distribution, and better living conditions.  Cardoso was quick to 
note that dependent development does not mean the achievement of a more egalitarian or more 
just society.  Dependent development in Latin America creates wealth and poverty, accumulation 
and shortage of capital, employment for some and unemployment for others.  These 
considerations stress that dependent capitalistic economies are not identical to the central 
developed capitalistic economies (Cardoso and Faletto xxiii).   
Cardoso made several contributions to dependency theory or what he preferred to call 
“dependency studies.”  His historical-structural approach has been adopted by several 
dependency theorists, and his emphasis on the importance of internal structure is now one of the 
basic tenets of dependency theory.  Though the idea of dependent development is still debated, 
Cardoso was the first to suggest that underdevelopment was a not a permanent state for 
dependent countries, and that there was considerable room for political and social action in the 
peripheral economies. 
 
III. The Main Concepts of Dependency Theory 
 Ronald H. Chilcote observed that “there are as many conceptions of dependency as there 
are authors” (9).  Many dependency theorists are reluctant to be associated with one another or 
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with a certain school of dependency, but they all agree that underdevelopment has causes 
external to the underdeveloped nations.  In addition, there are some basic theoretical propositions 
that are shared to some extent by most dependency theorists. 
 The dependency approach firmly rejects the dualist model and refutes the idea that the 
main obstacle to development is found in the traditional, backward sectors of the underdeveloped 
countries, which supposedly lack the characteristics of the modern developed capitalist 
economies (Angotti 126).  As a result, dependency theory opposes a universal theory of stages of 
growth.  Not all countries will go through the same stages.  Underdeveloped countries cannot 
simply follow a model of development similar to that followed by the now developed countries.  
Dependency theory rejects the notion that Latin America is undeveloped, waiting for capitalist 
development to modernize the region, in favor of a conception that underdevelopment is actively 
caused by the process of development in the advanced economies.  Latin American 
underdevelopment is not a backward condition which precedes capitalism, but a consequence of 
world capitalist expansion (Ray 5). 
Another major construct of dependency theory is the notion that the world is divided into 
“core” and “periphery” or “metropole” and “satellite.”  While the terminology may not be shared 
by all, the basic idea is the same: the core is composed of the affluent advanced countries and the 
periphery is made up of the underdeveloped poor countries (Angotti 126).  Capitalism promotes 
development in the core, but underdevelopment in the periphery.  The periphery is dependent 
upon the center, and the center expropriates surplus from the periphery.  Within each country 
metropolis-satellite relations are replicated as the economic surplus of the countryside drains into 
the urban areas. 
 Most dependency theorists regard the ruling classes in the periphery as dependent on 
external forces.  Elites in the satellite economies maintain dependency because their own private 
interests coincide with the interests of the dominant states.  In other words, external relationships 
of the underdeveloped countries have had a profound impact on their internal structures.  In 
general, dependency implies a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor in the 
underdeveloped countries (Tyler and Wogart 38).   
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IV. Critiques of Dependency Theory 
 “The litany of dependency’s sins is a long one,” said Munck (60).  Criticisms of 
dependency theory have emerged from a variety of ideological positions.  Dependency theory 
has a multitude of approaches and interpretations, and has been heavily criticized for its lack of a 
unified theory.  Omar Sánchez said, “In a literature so fraught with ambiguity, inconsistency and 
vagueness, it is difficult to say with assurance precisely what is meant by ‘dependency’” (4).   
 The most obvious weakness of dependency is its lack of empirical grounding.  Some 
social scientists have attempted to empirically verify the assumptions of dependency, but leading 
dependency figures, especially Cardoso, strongly opposed this trend, contending that dependency 
propositions could not be subjected to simple empirical evaluation.  William Tyler and J. Peter 
Wogart undertook a modest test of dependency along lines of an international comparison.  They 
simply concluded that “there is not sufficient evidence to reject the dependency hypothesis” (42).  
 David Ray said that one of dependency theory’s greatest weaknesses is the assertion that 
dependency is caused by the world expansion of capitalism.  By making such a claim, the 
dependency theorists have ignored another plausible and more comprehensive explanation.  
Large and powerful nations have always imposed economic dependence on smaller, weaker 
neighbors, but Ray noted that this has been true of both capitalist and non-capitalist nations 
throughout history.  Ray wrote, “Indeed, there is a striking similarity between the economic 
dependence which was imposed upon Latin America by the United States and the economic 
dependence which was imposed upon Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union [from the late 1940’s 
to the late 1980’s]” (8).  The dependency theorists have concluded that powerful capitalist 
countries impose dependence on weaker countries, but Ray pointed out that powerful non-
capitalist countries do the same.  He concluded, therefore, that the common denominator is not 
capitalism, but a disparity of power (9). 
 Several critics, including Ray, argue that dependency theorists treat dependency as a 
dichotomous variable instead of a continuous one.  Dos Santos implied that dependent countries 
face a choice between dependent capitalism or socialism, and there are no “intermediate 
solutions” (“Structure” 236).  Many dependency theorists have intimated that an underdeveloped 
country faces two choices: it is either dependent or it is not; it is either exploited or it is not.  Ray 
said, “Dependency/non-dependency is a continuous variable.  There are degrees of dependence, 
and there are significant differences among those degrees” (14).   
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Many dependency theorists imply that non-dependence is achievable, but they avoid any 
definition of non-dependence and they do not provide a description of what a non-dependent 
economy would look like.  The theorists say almost nothing about a non-dependent alternative 
and they rarely describe autonomous development.  Dependency theory’s inability to present a 
viable development alternative is one of its most glaring weaknesses. 
In their explanation of dependency, André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein 
defined capitalism as a system of exchange relations, characterized by monopoly and by 
exploitation.  They have been criticized because they failed to distinguish between modes of 
production and economic systems.  Their emphasis on metropolis-satellite relations leads to an 
overly abstract set of assertions: the core exploits the periphery and appropriates surplus (Petras 
150).  Brewer claims that Frank and Wallerstein failed to provide a real theory, and he suggests 
that the Marxist analysis of relations of production could fill in some of the gaps in their logic 
(Brewer 181). 
  Raúl Prebisch’s findings and the resulting body of dependency literature led many Latin 
American countries to adopt a policy of import substitution industrialization.  The leaders of 
Latin American countries realized that their economies could not improve if they continued to 
export only primary products and import manufactured goods.  The basic strategy for 
industrialization was to develop industries oriented toward the domestic market by limiting 
imports through tariffs and quotas to encourage the replacement of imported manufactures with 
domestic products.    
Import substitution industrialization policies did lead to economic growth in most Latin 
American countries from the 1950’s to the 1970’s, but industrialization did not have the 
consequences that policy makers hoped for.  Balance of payments difficulties worsened, real 
wages did not rise fast enough to increase aggregate demand, and unemployment problems 
remained.  This model was also highly reliant on foreign flows of capital that Latin American 
countries used to start their import substitution industries.  This policy came under attack when it 
became clear that the expectations that Latin American policy makers had for import substitution 
did not ensue.  
 There are several reasons why import substitution industrialization did not work out the 
way it was supposed to.  A period of protection does not necessarily create a competitive 
manufacturing sector if there are basic reasons why a country lacks a comparative advantage in 
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manufacturing (Krugman and Obstfeld 249).  Poor countries often lack skilled labor, 
entrepreneurs, and managerial competence, and may also experience problems of social 
organization.  While an import quota or tariff can allow an inefficient manufacturing sector to 
survive, it cannot directly make that sector more efficient.  Latin American countries hoped that 
by giving industries the shelter of tariffs and quotas, the manufacturing sector would learn to be 
efficient.  Moises Naim said that instead, import substitution industrialization “created an 
industrial base in Latin America that unfortunately was not very efficient, not very competitive, 
and was very dependent on foreign capital either borrowing or investing” (“Up for Debate” 4). 
 Evidence shows that protectionist policies associated with Latin American import 
substitution badly distorted incentives.  Many countries employed very complex methods to 
promote their industries by using overlapping import quotas, exchange controls, and domestic 
content rules.  Such high rates of protection allowed industries to survive even when their costs 
of production were three or four times more than the price of the imports they replaced.  The 
import restrictions also tended to promote production at an inefficiently small scale (Krugman 
and Obstfeld 249).  Often, the domestic markets of Latin American countries were not large 
enough to allow efficient-scale production.  Those who criticize Latin American import 
substitution also argue that it aggravated other problems like income inequality and 
unemployment (Krugman and Obstfeld 250).  Naim acknowledged these problems: 
Well, the reality is that very often it generates goods that are more expensive and 
probably of a lower quality and ends up impoverishing a lot of your neighbors, families 
and friends.  It may create jobs here and there, but in the long term it may create even 
more poverty… [Import substitution] sounds like a good idea, except that when you do it 
behind high barriers that inhibit the efficiencies of the companies because they are not 
threatened by competition, you create very lazy, noncompetitive companies that produce 
not very good goods at higher prices. (“Up for Debate” 5)   
 Radical dependency theory has been criticized for its lack of empirical grounding, its 
emphasis on the world expansion of capitalism as the cause of underdevelopment, its inability to 
suggest a practical development alternative, and its treatment of dependency as a dichotomous 
variable.  Import substitution industrialization, which came about in Latin America as a result of 
the growing body of policy-oriented dependency literature, has also been highly criticized because 
it did not solve the problems of Latin American underdevelopment.  By the mid-1980’s, 
dependency theory had reached an impasse.   
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V. The Currency of Dependency Theory 
Dependency theory is the product of a particular period in Latin America’s history and 
economic development.  Yet many of the pressing issues addressed by dependency theory still 
exist today.  Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson discuss some aspects of 
dependency theory that are still relevant in their article “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation.”  They hypothesize that settler mortality affected 
settlements; settlements affected early institutions; early institutions persisted and formed the 
basis of current institutions; and, current institutions affect income and economic growth (1373). 
Acemoglu et al. explain that different types of colonization policies created different 
types of institutions.  At one extreme, European powers established “extractive states” such as 
the Belgian Congo, the Gold Coast, and the Latin American colonies.  The main purpose of these 
extractive states was to transfer as much of the resources of the colony to the colonizer or 
metropole.  Within the extractive states there was a lack of protection for private property and 
there were no checks and balances against government expropriation.  These institutions were 
detrimental to investment and economic progress.  At the other extreme, European powers 
created “Neo-Europes” or “settler colonies” such as the United States, Australia, and New 
Zealand.   The settlers replicated European institutions and there was an emphasis on private 
property and checks against government power.  These institutions encouraged investment and 
economic growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 1370). 
The colonization strategy of the European powers was influenced by the feasibility of 
settlements.  In an unfavorable disease environment, the formation of extractive states was more 
likely.  In more favorable environments, the colonizers tended to establish “settler colonies.”  
Acemoglu et al. postulate that the colonial state and institutions persisted even after 
independence, suggesting that there is a strong correlation between early institutions and 
institutions today.  In other words, in places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they 
could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions.  These institutions persisted 
to the present (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 1370). 
Acemoglu et al. describe the colonial experience in Latin America during the 17th and 
18th centuries to strengthen his hypothesis.  They state, “The main objective of the Spanish and 
the Portuguese colonization was to obtain gold and other valuables from America” (1375).  The 
Spanish granted rights to land and labor and set up a complex mercantilist system full of 
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monopolies and regulations to extract resources from the colonies.  There is historical evidence 
which suggests that the control structures and extractive institutions established in the extractive 
colonies persisted after the colonial regime ended.  Acemoglu et al. explain that when the local 
elites inherited the extractive institutions, they may have not wanted to incur the costs of 
introducing better institutions so they exploited the existing extractive institutions for their own 
benefit.  As a result, in Latin America, the monopolies and regulations established by Spain 
remained intact even after independence (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 1376). 
In the first of issue of Latin American Perspectives Frank said, “Dependency is dead, 
long live dependency” (Topik 96).  Although dependency is no longer a popular outlook on 
underdevelopment, some of the central concepts of dependency are still relevant today.  
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson’s article discusses many of these issues.  They claim that 
Latin America was colonized as an “extractive colony” and has remained an extractive economy 
for the most part.  The persistence of extractive institutions explains the trade patterns that Latin 
America has experienced with developed countries and may also explain why Latin America has 
not caught up to some of the advanced nations.  Munck said, “We could, indeed, make the case 
that dependency is alive and well in Latin America today” (66).  Munck highlighted the growing 
income disparity within Latin America, the polarization between high and low-income groups of 
countries, and the declining terms of trade experienced by developing countries.  In 1998, Dos 
Santos said that the main reason dependency is not dead “is the persistence of a world economic 
system characterized by the difference between central or dominant nations and peripheral or 
dependent ones” (“Theoretical Foundations” 61). 
While dependency is considered a dead horse by some, many issues and questions 
addressed by dependency theory still exist.  Some of these issues are now arising in regard to 
Sino-Latin American trade relations.  Trade between the two regions has increased dramatically 
in the last 20 years as a result of China’s rapid economic growth.  Latin America exports mainly 
raw materials and primary products to China, while China exports manufactured goods to Latin 
America.  Many of the issues addressed by the dependency theorists are relevant to these trade 
patterns, and later in the paper I evaluate the extent to which Sino-Latin American trade 
resembles a dependent relationship.  In the next section, I review the history of Sino-Latin 
American trade relations, and then discuss current Sino-Latin American trade patterns. 
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PART THREE: SINO-LATIN AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONS 
 
I. History of Sino-Latin American Trade Relations 
 Trade relations between China and Latin America date back to the 1560’s when a marine 
silk road was built between China’s coastal region and Mexico’s Acapulco via Manila.  The 
Chinese exported silk, porcelain, cotton cloth, arts and crafts, jewelry, gun powder, and animals 
to Latin America, and imported shoes, hats, wine, olive oil, soap, tobacco, and food from the 
region.  By the early 19th century, Spain began importing silk and other goods directly from 
China via new maritime routes.  At the same time, Great Britain was exporting more and more to 
Latin America, reducing the Latin American demand for Chinese goods.  As a result, in 1815, 
the last ship sailed from Acapulco to Manila via the silk road on the sea (Shixue 1).   
 In 1949, when the “new China” was founded, Chinese leaders hoped to develop 
economic relations with Latin America.  Bilateral trade between the two regions, however, 
remained limited in scale and scope from the 1950’s to the 1970’s.  In fact, it was not until 1978 
when China carried out some reform policies that economic relations between the two regions 
developed more rapidly (Shixue 2).  Jorge I. Domínguez, the director of the Weatherhead Center 
for International Affairs at Harvard University, explains that China kept and developed 
diplomatic and economic relations with South American military regimes, especially Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile, in the 1970’s.  As a result, Latin American military and right-wing political 
and social forces were not and are still not fearful of China.  Throughout the 1970’s, China also 
developed its relations with civilian governments in Mexico and Venezuela.  Domínguez 
concludes that “Latin America had long been ready for a boom in it relations with China, but 
only in the current decade did China achieve the capacity to capitalize on such opportunities” (3). 
 In April 2001, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin took a 13-day tour to Chile, 
Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Cuba to increase economic and trade ties.  This visit 
generated a wave of visits by senior officials and business leaders between China and Latin 
America to discuss political, economic, and military concerns (Domínguez 2).  In November 
2004, current Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Latin America in conjunction with an Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Santiago, Chile.  Before the summit meeting, 
Hu visited Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba, and signed 39 bilateral agreements concerning 
energy cooperation, infrastructure financing, commodity purchasing contracts, and deals in 
telecommunications, education, and tourism (Jubany and Poon 3).  During this trip, Hu also 
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announced China’s promise of providing $100 billion in investments in Latin America over the 
next 10 years (Orozco 2).   
In January and February 2005, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong visited Mexico, 
Venezuela, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica with a group of Chinese officials and top 
business executives.  In Jamaica, he attended the first ministerial meeting of the China-Caribbean 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum.  During this trip he signed 38 agreements in energy, 
economic cooperation, transport, telecommunications, and other fields.  Key Latin American 
leaders have also led some high-level trade and investment delegations to China, including 
Bolivian President Morales in January 2006, Brazilian President da Silva in May 2004, 
Argentine President Kirchner in November 2004, and Venezuelan President Chavez in 
December 2004 (Jubany and Poon 3).  These visits show that China and Latin America have 
clearly attached greater importance to their bilateral economic relations. 
 
II. Current Sino-Latin American Trade Relations 
In 2005, China became the fourth largest economy in the world, overtaking the United 
Kingdom.  China’s economy has been growing at nearly ten percent a year for the past quarter 
century, and its share of world trade has jumped from a meager 1 percent to 6 percent.  As 
China’s worldwide trade increased, its trade with Latin America did too.   Trade values between 
the two regions increased greatly from $1.3 billion in 1980 to $12 billion in 2000 to about $50 
billion in 2005.  From 1993 to 2003 trade expanded by 600 percent and doubled from 2000 to 
2003 when total trade reached $26.8 billion (Ho 2).  China became Latin America’s third largest 
trading partner in 2005, and Chinese imports from Latin America have grown by 60 percent on 
average per year since 1999 (Mitchell and Bajpaee 1).  In 2004 and 2005, China’s imports from 
Latin America came predominantly from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Peru.  In those 
same years, China’s top export destinations in Latin America were Mexico, Brazil, Panama, 
Chile, and Argentina (Dumbaugh and Sullivan 2). 
Almost all Latin American countries have experienced an increase in their exports to 
China.  These exports are mostly raw materials and natural resources.  In fact, about 75 percent 
of Latin America’s exports to China are made up of primary products (Jenkins, Peters, and 
Moreira 3).  The reason for this pattern is simple: China is searching for energy resources, raw 
materials, and commodities to maintain its economic growth.  China needs oil, coal, iron ore, and 
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copper for its factories; soybeans and poultry to feed its 1.3 billion people; lumber for housing; 
and, feeding stuffs for its livestock.  Total Chinese commodity imports have increased by a 
factor of 20 over the last two decades to nearly $20 billion in 2004, and commodities now make 
up about a third of China’s total imports (Trinh, Voss, and Dyck 2).  In 2003, Chinese imports of 
nickel doubled, its copper imports increased by 15 percent, oil by 30 percent, and soybeans by 70 
percent.  China is the world’s leading importer of copper, metal ores, textile fibers, and pulp and 
paper (Santiso 2).   
Latin America has a strong commodity endowment: 47 percent of world exports of 
soybeans and 40 percent of world exports of copper are concentrated in the region, among other 
important primary products (Santiso 2).  The region has the commodities and raw materials that 
China needs to maintain its economic growth.  Deutsche Bank Research says although Chinese 
commodity import demand growth rates have peaked or will peak soon, they will remain in 
lower double-digit territory for the next ten years.  These growth rates signify staggering 
increases in import demand quantities for these commodities (Trinh, Voss, and Dyck 3).  
According to this finding, China will continue to show a voracious appetite for Latin American 
raw materials, energy resources, and agricultural products, from oil to lumber to copper to 
soybeans.     
In regards to the different metal ores, China is the number one importer of iron ore, 
manganese, lead, and chromium with shares of world imports ranging from 32 percent to 54 
percent (Trinh, Voss, and Dyck 4).  Most of these metals are used in China’s fast growing steel 
industry.  Brazil is the largest exporter of iron worldwide and the third largest supplier of the 
metal for China.  In 2004, Brazil supplied about 22 percent of China’s total imports of iron ore.  
China is the world’s second largest importer of copper, which is used mainly in electrical 
products, metal products, and almost any Chinese industry from IT hardware to automobile 
assembly.  Chilean copper makes up about one-fifth of China’s total copper imports while China 
accounts for about one-sixth of Chile’s copper exports (Domínguez 18).  Chile and Peru are the 
world’s leading copper producers, and together they account for more than half of China’s 
imports of the metal (Trinh, Voss, and Dyck 7). 
Increased consumption of soybean oil and soybean meal has driven the growth in 
Chinese soybean demand.   China accounts for about 40 percent of world soybean imports, worth 
about $7 billion in 2004.  Brazil and Argentina are the world’s second and third largest producers 
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of soybeans, respectively.  Together the two countries account for more than 50 percent of 
China’s total soybean imports.  Between 1999 and 2004, China’s imports of soybeans from 
Argentina and Brazil experienced a ten-fold increase from $360 million to $3.6 billion (Trinh, 
Voss, and Dyck 9).  In addition, Brazil and Argentina supply almost 20 percent of China’s meat 
imports.   
China’s dominant import commodity is crude oil, and the emerging powerhouse is now 
the world’s second largest consumer of oil after the United States.  China’s largest energy trading 
partner in Latin America is Venezuela, but Venezuelan petroleum sales to China represented 
only 2.3 percent of China’s total oil imports in 2005.  Most Venezuelan oil is low-grade and 
sulfur-rich, and most Chinese refineries cannot generate gasoline and heating oil from such 
petroleum, which is why China imports so little of it.  Recent forecasts, however, have predicted 
that by 2012, Venezuelan oil will account for 15 to 20 percent of China’s oil import needs 
(Jubany and Poon 4).  The two countries have agreed on a strategic energy plan that extends until 
2011 and commits Venezuela to increase oil exports to China (Jubany and Poon 2).  China is also 
exploring energy deals in Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.   
While many Latin American countries have a comparative advantage in natural resource-
based goods and commodities, China enjoys a comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods 
like electronics, apparel, toys, and footwear because of the country’s vast labor abundance.  A 
labor force of 640 million translates into wages that are well below the prevailing rates.  In fact, 
wages are four times lower in China than in Latin America on average (Blázquez-Lidoy, 
Rodríguez, and Santiso 14).  Latin America provides a large market for these relatively cheap 
Chinese manufactured products.  For the region as a whole, China’s share of total imports 
increased from 1.9 percent in 1999 to 5.1 percent in 2003.  About 90 percent of those imports 
were manufactured goods, and over 85 percent were non-resource-based manufactures (Jenkins, 
Peters, and Moreira 4).    
 
III. The Analysts’ Evaluation of Sino-Latin American Trade Relations 
The growth in Sino-Latin American trade has led many analysts to evaluate whether 
China is a threat or an opportunity for Latin America.  In these evaluations, many analysts have 
focused on trade competition.  In “Angel or Devil? China’s Trade Impact on Latin American 
Emerging Markets,” Jorge Blázquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodríguez, and Javier Santiso suggest that 
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there is generally very little direct trade competition between China and Latin America in the US 
market.  Using a database of 620 different goods, they compare Chinese trade competition from 
1998 to 2004.  They break down the results by country and find that Paraguay, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, and Panama suffer least from Chinese trade competition.  Brazil, Colombia, and Peru 
are in an intermediate position, and Mexico and Central American countries face the most 
Chinese competition (19).  Based on China’s strong demand for raw materials and the 
subsequent increase in commodity prices, the authors conclude that “Latin America is a clear 
trade winner from China’s global integration” (7).  
Most analysts agree that overall, China and Latin America have complementary rather 
than competing economies.  China needs raw materials and commodities, and Latin America 
supplies them.  Countries with a strong comparative advantage in natural resource-based sectors, 
such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile, are benefiting greatly from China’s increased demand 
for primary products.  In addition to providing commodities and raw materials, Latin America 
also offers a large market for China’s cheap manufactured goods.  As a result of this 
complementarity, some analysts have labeled Sino-Latin American trade “a match made in trade 
heaven” (Orozco 1).   
While most analysts claim that China provides a “helping hand” for Latin America, 
others have acknowledged that China’s low labor costs pose a threat to some countries.  Soon 
after China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, it flooded the region with cheap 
manufactured products, threatening local Latin American industries (Orozco 1).  China poses the 
greatest threat to countries that rely heavily on labor-intensive manufacturing as their export 
advantage, particularly Mexico and the Central American countries.  These countries are facing 
shrinking participation rates in the export market, especially in the US.  Domínguez says that 
China has become a strong competitor in manufactured goods, “making deep inroads into 
markets in Mexico and Central America and, more recently, in Brazil and Argentina” (2).  In 
addition, Mexico and Central American countries are experiencing growing trade deficits with 
China, while most Latin American countries are experiencing trade surpluses. 
Andres Oppenheimer, Latin American editor and foreign affairs columnist with The 
Miami Herald, warns that China will soon switch from exporting apparel, footwear, and toys to 
exporting more sophisticated products, like cars and trucks.  Manuel Rocha, a former US 
ambassador to Bolivia who now heads a consulting firm selling Chinese buses in Latin America, 
 24 
says, “There will be massive sales of more sophisticated Chinese products in Latin America.  
Their quality is decent, and they sell way below market prices” (Oppenheimer 1).  This could 
have a negative impact on the region, leading to large trade deficits with China.  Thus far, China 
has been a godsend to countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru by importing massive 
amounts of soybeans, copper, nickel, and other primary products.  Oppenheimer warns that if 
China begins selling high value-added goods to the region, Sino-Latin American trade may no 
longer be as beneficial to Latin America as in the past. 
 For some Latin American countries, China’s growth provides a trade opportunity, but for 
others, China poses a competitive threat.  Next, I will focus in detail on two Latin American 
countries, Brazil and Mexico, and their starkly different trade relations with China.   
 
PART FOUR: CASE STUDIES 
 
I. Sino-Brazilian Trade Relations 
 Analysts agree that China’s most important relationship in Latin America is with Brazil.  
The two established commercial relations before the 1949 communist victory in China, and 
diplomatic relations in 1974 when Brazil was under an anti-communist military dictatorship.  
Once diplomatic relations were solidified, Sino-Brazilian trade developed rapidly, and since the 
1990’s bilateral trade has exploded (Domínguez 27).   
In 1994, Brazil became the first Latin American country that China labeled a “strategic 
partner.”  Both Brazil and China seek a stronger and more influential place in international 
affairs, and they welcome a more constrained role for the United States (Domínguez 28).  Brazil 
wants China to be a “soft balance” to US power in Latin America by providing new political and 
economic options.  Brazil supported China’s membership into the World Trade Organization and 
recognized China as a “market economy” during Jintao’s 2004 visit.  In addition, Brazil backs 
China’s bid for membership in the Inter-American Development Bank.  The two joined together 
as leaders of the Group of 20 within the Doha Round of negotiations to demand agricultural 
safeguards for less developed countries.  China and Brazil have also cooperated in satellite 
technology, energy and infrastructure development, and aircraft manufacturing (Mitchell and 
Bajpaee 2).   
Sino-Brazilian trade has experienced a tremendous boom since the 1990’s.  In fact, China 
is Brazil’s fastest-growing export market.  In 2003, Brazil accounted for 42 percent of Latin 
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American exports to China (Buck 18).  China purchased 80 percent more from Brazil in 2003 
than in 2002.  Bilateral trade quintupled from 2000 to 2004, totaling over $12 billion in 2004.  In 
the first three months of 2007, bilateral trade totaled $4.348 billion (“Chinese exports” 1).  China 
bought 5.7 percent of Brazil’s exports in 2005, up from 1.4 percent in 1999.   In 2004, China 
became Brazil’s fourth most important trade partner, and since mid-2005, China is among 
Brazil’s three largest trading partners (Domínguez 27).   
 China seeks economic security, especially in food and natural resources.  Brazil’s ample 
reserves of iron ore, soybeans, wood, and arable land seem to be a perfect match for China’s 
growing scarcity and demand for these resources.  As a result, Brazil’s top four exports to China 
are all raw materials and foodstuffs.  In 2005, 75 percent of exports from Brazil to China were 
focused on just five commodities: soy, iron ore, steel, soy oil, and wood (“Brazil exports” 1).  
Soybean trade in particular has exploded between the two regions.  China began looking 
overseas for soybean supplies in the mid-1990’s when the scope of its land and water problems 
became evident.  In 2004, soybeans made up about 30 percent and soybean products another 9 
percent of Brazil’s exports to China.  These soybean exports represented only 2.2 percent of 
Brazil’s total worldwide exports, but 30 percent of China’s total soybean imports (Domínguez 
19).  In 2006, Brazil sent about 11 million tons of soybeans to China, a 50 percent increase from 
the previous year, and about double the amount shipped in 2004 (Barrionuevo 4). 
 Many analysts argue that the current Sino-Brazilian trade patterns are beneficial to Brazil.  
China’s strong demand for commodities has pushed up the prices of copper, iron ore, soybeans, 
and other primary products.  Brazil now enjoys larger volumes of exports and higher world 
prices for its commodities (Jenkins, Peters, and Moreira 10).  Others, however, have expressed 
concern regarding Sino-Brazilian trade patterns.  Alexei Barrionuevo says, “For all the gains 
here, though, the surge in exports to China has a created a sense of unease among many in 
Brazilian agriculture, who worry the tightening relationship will accelerate a development model 
in which Brazil is too reliant on sales of raw natural resources rather than higher-value products” 
(3).  This issue will be discussed in detail later in the paper. 
 While Brazilian commodity suppliers have benefited from China’s strong demand for 
natural resources and raw materials, Brazilian manufacturers in footwear, toys, textiles, and 
electronics are beginning to suffer from Chinese competition.  In 2004, 80 percent of Brazil’s 
imports from China were manufactured goods (Jenkins, Peters, and Moreira 14).  One out of four 
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Brazilian businesses now competes with imported Chinese merchandise.  In 2005, Brazilian 
shoemakers sold 23 million fewer pairs than the previous year and cut 15,000 jobs.  Analysts 
warn that within the next five years, China’s automobile industry will become the new looming 
threat for Brazil, the world’s number nine car manufacturing country (“Trade Deficit” 10).   
 Since late 2003 Brazil has enjoyed a trade surplus with China, but in the first quarter of 
2007, Brazil’s trade with China slipped into a deficit.  This change is attributed to China’s 
increased shipments of manufactured goods to Brazil.  In March 2007, Chinese exports to Brazil 
reached $942 million, the highest figure ever reached in a single month of trade between the two 
countries.  Since 2007, China has overtaken Argentina as the second largest supplier of imported 
goods to Brazil, behind the US.  Foreign Trade Studies Center economist Fernando Ribeiro says, 
“This year we [Brazil] are going to mark a trade deficit with China…It is just a taste of what we 
have ahead of us” (“Trade Deficit” 11). 
 Domínguez says, “These concerns do not override, however, the overwhelmingly 
positive sense of success, dynamism, and a bright future in Sino-Brazilian relations” (30).  While 
some analysts like Domínguez emphasize the boom in commodity trade enjoyed by Brazilian 
primary product producers, others have spotted a clear worrying trend.  Brazilian manufacturers 
are experiencing increased competition from China, and Brazil now faces trade deficits as China 
exports more and more manufactured goods to the region.  The next few years will test whether 
China and Brazil can live up to the expression—a strategic partnership. 
 
II. Sino-Mexican Trade Relations 
 Like Brazil, Mexico is one of China’s “strategic partners” in Latin America.  In 1971, 
Mexican President Luis Echeverría established diplomatic relations with China.  In 1973, 
Echeverría became the first Latin American president to visit Beijing.  Throughout Echeverría’s 
presidency from 1970 to 1976, China and Mexico cooperated many times in multilateral 
organizations, and trade disputes were minor (Domínguez 38).  There remains a good political 
understanding between the two countries.  China and Mexico share similar views of international 
affairs, have made similar stances in multilateral bodies, and several Chinese leaders studied at 
the Colegio de Mexico and speak Spanish fluently (Jubany and Poon 1).  In addition, Mexico 
supports China’s bid to join the Inter-American Development Bank. 
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 The Sino-Mexican relationship is marked by cooperative political dialogue on the one 
hand, and tense economic relations on the other.  The first “dark cloud” appeared in 1993 when 
President Carlos Salinas’s administration imposed anti-dumping duties of 1,100 percent on shoe, 
toy, and textile imports from China (Shixue 3).  These duties, which were equal to a total ban, 
were levied in response to Mexico’s fear of Chinese competition.  In June 2001, Mexican 
President Vincente Fox visited Beijing to discuss China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization and to promote Mexican exports.  China’s membership in the WTO meant Mexico 
would have to remove the anti-dumping duties.  Mexico also feared that China within the WTO 
would compete strongly with Mexican exports in the US market.  As a result, Mexico was the 
last of the 141 members of the WTO to sign a bilateral agreement with China to clear its 
admission to the organization (Domínguez 38). 
 Mexico’s overall trade importance for China is second only to Brazil’s in the region.  
Mexico is China’s principal export market in Latin America, and since 2003, China has become 
Mexico’s second largest trading partner only after the US (Jenkins, Peters, and Moreira 21).  
China tends to buy natural resources and primary products from the majority of Latin American 
countries, but Sino-Mexican trade most resembles trade between industrial nations.  China 
exports electromechanical equipment, household appliances, textiles, and chemical products to 
Mexico, while Mexico exports synthetic fibers, steel products, plastics, and beer to China 
(Domínguez 39).  Sino-Mexican trade is growing rapidly, but asymmetrically.  China imports 
less than 1 percent of Mexico’s total exports, but is the second largest supplier for Mexico’s 
imports.  In 2004, Mexican exports to China were $1.9 billion, while Chinese exports to Mexico 
reached $9.1 billion (Orozco 3).  Mexico has a growing trade deficit with China which reached 
$14 billion in 2006.   For every dollar that Mexico makes from its exports to China, China makes 
$31 from its exports to Mexico (Johnson 5).  No other Latin American country has such large 
deficits with China.   
 In addition to concerns about the asymmetrical nature of Sino-Mexican trade, Chinese 
competition continues to threaten Mexican manufacturers.  The two countries are direct 
competitors, particularly in the production of labor-intensive goods.  China and Mexico 
specialize in similar sectors: IT and consumer electronics, electronic components, automobile 
parts, clothing, textiles, footwear, basic manufactures, and leather products.  China can produce 
these labor-intensive goods at a much lower cost.  On average in 2002, the Chinese monthly 
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salary in the manufacturing sector was $112, while it was around $440 in Mexico (Blázquez-
Lidoy, Rodríguez, and Santiso 14).  Carlos Rovelo, an international business professor at 
Eastfield College in Dallas says, “Mexico can’t compete with Chinese government subsidies and 
cheap labor” (Orozco 3). 
 In 2003, Mexico was overtaken by China as the US’s second largest supplier.  Also in 
that year, Mexico lost market share in the US import market for the first time since the 1994 
North American Free Trade Agreement.  Domínguez says that 12 of Mexico’s twenty most 
important economic sectors that export to the US face some or substantial competition from 
China (39).  In sectors like automobile parts, television receivers, video monitors, electric 
motors, and generators, Mexico continues to hold strong market share despite modest Chinese 
inroads.  In lower technology goods, however, China has a much stronger and often dominating 
share in the US market.  Empirical studies show that in sectors like electronics, textiles, 
footwear, and clothing, China has directly displaced Mexico’s production in both the domestic 
market and the US market (Jenkins, Peters, and Moreira 24).  In addition to losing US market 
share, Mexico has lost an estimated 400,000 jobs to China since 2003.  Sony, NEC, VTech, and 
Kodak have closed their Mexican operations and moved to China.  By 2003, 85 percent of shoe 
manufacturers in Mexico had shifted operations to China.  In 2006 alone, more than 300 
companies moved production from Mexico to China (Buck 9).   
 Some analysts believe that the “China threat” is a good wake-up call for Mexico and may 
lead to reforms that allow Mexico to remain in the competitiveness race.  Chinese competition 
may stimulate Mexico to upgrade its manufacturing industry and enhance human skills.  Mexico 
has already begun to engage in activities that require more skilled labor such as aeronautics, 
software, and pharmaceuticals.  Several analysts emphasize that Mexico’s proximity to the US 
gives it a competitive advantage over China.  Goods shipped across the Rio Grande reach their 
destinations more quickly than the three weeks needed for Chinese shipments to reach 
California.  Roger Tissot, director for Latin America at PFC Energy says, “Mexico should 
reorganize its export strategy by focusing on manufacturing hard-to-ship goods like cars and 
appliances” (Orozco 4).  Mexico may want to identify sectors and products where the issues of 
distance and time are key comparative and competitive assets. 
 Mexico realizes that China’s threat is very real.  Mexico had sought to capitalize on its 
comparative advantage in producing labor-intensive, low value-added goods, but this “put it on a 
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collision route with China” (Buck 22).  Unlike many Latin American countries, Mexico does not 
want China to provide a soft or hard balance to US influence.  Instead, President Fox’s policy is 
to contain competition from Chinese firms against Mexican producers in NAFTA markets.  In 
2005, Fox publicly referred to China as Mexico’s competitor, not its partner (Domínguez 39).  
Mexico and China have strategic value for each other, but clearly they are not yet partners.   
 
PART FIVE: SINO-LATIN AMERICAN TRADE DATA 
 
China’s Share in World Trade 
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China’s economic boom is a major global change, and some analysts have called China’s 
emergence “the issue of the decade” (Blázquz-Lidoy, Rodríguez, and Santiso 9).  In 2005, China 
became the fourth largest economy in the world, overtaking the United Kingdom.  Over the last 
20 years, China has emerged as a major player in world trade.  China’s share in world trade 
jumped from a meager 3.1 percent in 1999 to almost 7 percent in 2005.  If China’s growth in 
trade holds, the powerhouse will emerge as the third largest trading economy in the world, 
overcoming for the first time Japan and ranking behind the United States and Germany. 
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China’s Trade with Main World Regions 
 
Year US & 
Canada 
Europe Asia Middle 
East 
Latin 
America 
1999 18.372 2.969 34.616 2.485 2.205 
2000 17.169 3.330 34.906 3.610 2.537 
2001 17.245 3.652 34.076 3.397 2.842 
2002 16.943 3.756 35.862 3.229 2.784 
2003 16.046 4.029 35.436 3.410 3.047 
2004 16.059 3.908 35.465 3.536 3.383 
2005 16.275 4.284 35.185 3.992 3.420 
Note: The table shows China’s trade with the main world regions as a percentage of China’s total trade. 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
 
China’s economic growth explains its boom in trade with various areas of the world.  
China trades predominantly with other Asian countries.  In fact, Sino-Asian trade accounts for 
more than a third of China’s total trade.  After Asia, China trades the most with the United States 
and Canada, but their share in China’s total trade has decreased slightly since 1999.  Latin 
America’s share in overall Chinese trade is still small, but has increased steadily over the last 20 
years, and markedly since 1999.   
 
Trade Between China and Latin America 
 
Year Total Trade 
1999 7,951 
2000 12,034 
2001 14,503 
2002 17,291 
2003 25,939 
2004 39,070 
2005 48,653 
Note: Trade values are in US dollars (millions). 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
 
 31 
Trade Between China and Latin America
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
US
 
Do
lla
rs
 
(m
ill
io
n
s)
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
 
Bilateral trade between China and Latin America was limited in scale and scope until the 
1970’s.  It was not until 1978 when China carried out some reform policies that economic 
relations between the two regions developed more rapidly.  Sino-Latin American trade values 
increased remarkably from $1.3 billion in 1980 to $12 billion in 2000 to about $50 billion in 
2005.  From 2000 to 2005, bilateral trade quadrupled, and in 2005, China became Latin 
America’s third largest trading partner.  Analysts predict that by 2010, Sino-Latin American 
trade values will reach $100 billion.   
 
China’s Imports from Latin American Countries 
 
Year Arg Bra Chi Col Mex Pan Per Ven Total 
LA 
Total 
World 
1995 370 1,228 231 14 195 8.4 460 15.8 2,522 132,163 
1996 518 1,484 455 0.9 297 1.7 523 25 3,305 138,949 
1997 721 1,486 415 3.4 184 1.6 617 32 3,460 142,163 
1998 723 1,133 422 8.2 152 1.2 288 13 2,740 140,385 
1999 590 969 664 21 159 1.1 310 28 2,742 165,718 
2000 930 1,621 1,339 32 488 1 560 95 5,066 225,175 
2001 1,281 2,347 1,303 26 763 2 498 146 6,366 243,567 
2002 1,240 3,003 1,565 29 1,115 4 732 145 7,833 295,440 
2003 2,729 5,844 2,245 60 1,677 29 760 542 13,886 412,836 
2004 3,255 8,684 3,676 176 2,140 15 1,524 738 20,208 561,442 
2005 3,800 9,982 4,943 205 2,227 22 2,265 1,106 24,550 660,218 
Note: The figures represent the raw value of China’s imports in US dollars (millions) from each country.  
The “Total LA” column refers to the total value of imports contributed by these countries.  The “Total 
World” column refers to the total value of all of China’s imports per year.  The countries are (in order 
shown): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
 32 
China's Imports From Latin American Countries
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
11000
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
Year
US
 
Do
lla
rs
 
(m
ill
io
n
s)
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
 
China’s imports from Latin America have grown 60 percent on average each year since 
1999.  In 2004, Latin America accounted for 4 percent of China’s total imports.  China has 
turned to Latin America, especially Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, to satisfy its growing demand 
for raw materials and natural resources.  As a result, most Latin American countries are 
witnessing a tremendous increase in their exports to China.  In 2004, exports to China 
represented 6 to 10 percent of the exports of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru.   
China’s imports from Brazil in particular have experienced a tremendous boom since the 
1990’s.  China purchased almost 50 percent more from Brazil in 2004 than in 2003.  Since 2001, 
Brazil has accounted for at least 35 percent of China’s imports from Latin America.  Most 
analysts agree that Brazil’s vast reserves of iron ore, wood, and arable land are a good match to 
China’s growing scarcity of these resources.  In 2005, soybeans, iron ore, steel, soy oil, and 
wood made up 75 percent of China’s imports from Brazil.  
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China’s Exports to Latin American Countries 
 
Year Arg Bra Chi Col Mex Pan Per Ven Total 
LA 
Total 
World 
1995 274 759 411 52 195 594 146 69 2,500 148,955 
1996 337 768 464 47 221 486 139 52 2,514 151,165 
1997 465 1,057 563 70 415 1,010 98 119 3,797 182,917 
1998 550 1,086 619 93 689 1,053 107 170 4,367 183,744 
1999 496 876 605 104 792 1,037 131 161 4,202 194,936 
2000 610 1,224 784 156 1,335 1,290 144 256 5,799 249,208 
2001 574 1,363 816 205 1,819 1,240 177 444 6,638 266,709 
2002 185 1,466 998 287 2,864 1,274 247 333 7,654 325,744 
2003 447 2,145 1,283 398 3,267 1,480 354 199 9,573 438,364 
2004 852 3,675 1,689 630 4,973 2,187 418 596 15,020 593,358 
2005 1,325 4,829 2,151 930 5,537 3,151 609 837 19,369 762,337 
Note: The figures represent the raw value of China’s exports to each country in US dollars (millions).  
The “Total LA” column refers to the total value exported to these countries per year.  The “Total World” 
column refers to the total value of all of China’s exports per year.  The countries are (in order shown): 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
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China entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, and since then it has increased its 
exports of cheap manufactured goods to Latin America.  Latin America’s share of Chinese 
exports rose from 1 percent in 1990 to 3 percent in 2004.  In 2005, China’s top Latin American 
export destinations were Mexico, Brazil, Panama, Chile, and Argentina.  China’s exports to Latin 
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America typically consist of labor-intensive goods, including electronics, footwear, clothing, 
textiles, and appliances.  Analysts predict that China will soon begin to sell more sophisticated 
products to the region, such as cars and trucks. 
 
Percentage of Total Trade with China 
 
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Peru 
1999 3.10 1.57 3.08 0.73 2.61 
2000 3.79 1.99 4.91 0.90 5.26 
2001 4.67 2.82 5.58 1.30 5.64 
2002 4.10 3.79 6.61 2.07 5.55 
2003 7.37 5.47 7.67 3.06 5.66 
2004 7.03 5.70 8.82 3.95 7.04 
2005 7.03 6.35 9.64 4.32 9.86 
Note: The table shows each country’s trade with China as a percentage of its total trade. 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
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In the last five years, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru have experienced 
increases in their trade with China as a percentage of their total trade.  This trend indicates that 
China has come to matter significantly for Latin American countries.  Brazil in particular has 
attached greater importance to its trade relations with China.  Sino-Brazilian trade has more than 
quadrupled in just four years.  In 2004, China became Brazil’s fourth most important trade 
partner, and since mid-2005, China is among Brazil’s three largest trading partners. 
 35 
Chile’s Copper Exports to China  
 
Year Chile’s Copper 
Exports to China 
Chile’s Total 
Exports to China 
Copper Exports as a % of 
Total Exports to China 
1999 111,680,136 357,304,416 31.256 
2000 382,453,728 901,769,408 42.411 
2001 333,726,016 1,065,034,432 31.335 
2002 568,263,360 1,224,824,064 46.396 
2003 897,224,640 1,817,061,632 49.378 
2004 1,706,711,122 3,211,996,580 53.136 
2005 1,889,851,691 4,389,876,909 43.050 
Note: The table shows Chile’s total copper exports to China, Chile’s total exports to China, and Chile’s 
copper exports to China as a percentage of its total exports to China.  Export values are in US dollars and 
are based on the SITC Rev. 1 classification. 
Source: UN Comtrade (Commodity Trade Database) 
 
China is the world’s largest importer of copper, which it uses in electrical products, metal 
products, IT hardware, and automobile parts.  In 2005, China’s share of world copper imports 
rose to 22 percent.  Chile is the world’s largest copper producer, and it supplies about 20 percent 
of China’s copper imports.  Chile’s main export products to China are copper, paper, and fish 
flour, but copper is clearly the most important export product.  Since 1999, copper has made up 
42 percent of Chile’s exports to China on average.  Analysts predict that China’s demand for this 
metal is unlikely to subside any time soon, which means that Chile’s exports to China may 
become even more concentrated in copper.   
 
Brazil’s Iron Ore Exports to China  
 
Year Brazil’s Total Iron Ore 
Exports to China 
Brazil’s Total 
Exports to China 
Iron Ore Exports as a % 
of Total Exports to China 
1999 241,177,382 676,129,026 35.670 
2000 271,191,744 1,085,208,064 24.990 
2001 482,633,248 1,902,078,208 25.374 
2002 597,225,472 2,520,439,040 23.695 
2003 764,857,259 4,531,677,822 16.878 
2004 1,114,955,800 5,437,825,968 20.504 
2005 1,784,631,125 6,830,977,328 26.126 
Note: The table shows Brazil’s total iron ore exports to China, Brazil’s total exports to China, and 
Brazil’s iron ore exports to China as a percentage of its total exports to China.  Export values are in US 
dollars and are based on the SITC Rev. 1 classification. 
Source: UN Comtrade (Commodity Trade Database) 
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 China is also the world’s largest importer of iron ore.  In 2004, China’s share of world 
iron ore imports rose to 40 percent.  Iron ore is used in China’s fast-growing steel industry, and 
analysts forecast that China’s demand for the metal will continue to rise.  Brazil is the largest 
exporter of iron ore worldwide and the third largest supplier of the metal for China.  Brazil 
supplies about a quarter of China’s iron ore imports.  Since 1999, iron ore has made up about 25 
percent of Brazil’s exports to China on average. 
 
Brazil’s Soybean Exports to China 
 
Year Brazil’s Soybean 
Exports to China 
Brazil’s Total 
Exports to China 
Brazil’s Soybean Exports as a 
% of Total Exports to China 
1999 111,289,569 676,129,026 16.460 
2000 337,350,336 1,085,208,064 31.086 
2001 537,663,744 1,902,078,208 28.267 
2002 825,474,496 2,520,439,040 32.751 
2003 1,313,073,236 4,531,677,822 28.975 
2004 1,621,735,722 5,437,825,968 29.823 
2005 1,716,921,127 6,830,977,328 25.134 
Note: The table shows Brazil’s soybean exports to China, Brazil’s total exports to China, and Brazil’s 
soybean exports to China as a percentage of its total exports to China.  Export values are in US dollars 
and are based on the SITC Rev. 1 classification. 
Source: UN Comtrade (Commodity Trade Database) 
 
 In 1996, China became a net importer of soybeans, and the country now accounts for 
about 40 percent of world soybean imports.  China’s soybean imports have risen steadily because 
domestic production has been unable to fulfill rising demand.  Brazil is the world’s second 
largest producer of soybeans, accounting for 40 percent of world soybean exports.  As a result of 
China’s increased demand, Brazil’s soybean production has showed strong growth.  Brazil 
supplies 30 percent of China’s total soybean imports, and since 1999, soybeans have made up 27 
percent of Brazil’s exports to China on average. 
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Argentina’s Soybean Exports to China 
 
Year Arg’s Soybean 
Exports to China 
Arg’s Total Exports 
to China 
Arg’s Soybean Exports as a % 
of Total Exports to China 
1999 162,129,793 507,888,347 31.922 
2000 531,219,224 796,927,268 66.658 
2001 827,964,636 1,122,612,132 73.753 
2002 505,193,370 1,092,354,111 46.248 
2003 1,226,877,530 2,478,422,770 49.502 
2004 1,153,431,840 2,630,446,718 43.849 
2005 1,727,087,815 3,154,288,661 54.754 
Note: The table shows Argentina’s soybean exports to China, Argentina’s total exports to China, and 
Argentina’s soybean exports to China as a percentage of its total exports to China.  Export values are in 
US dollars and are based on the SITC Rev. 1 classification. 
Source: UN Comtrade (Commodity Trade Database) 
 
 Argentina is the world’s third largest producer of soybeans after the United States and 
Brazil.  Argentina accounts for about 15 percent of world soybean exports.  Since 1999, 
soybeans have accounted for about half of Argentina’s total exports to China on average, with 
other agricultural and livestock products accounting for nearly all of the remainder.  Together 
Argentina and Brazil account for more than half of China’s total soybean imports. 
 
Competition Between China and Mexico 
 
 China 2002 China 2004 Mexico 2002 Mexico 2004 
Wood Products 0.45 0.43 0.26 0.26 
Leather Products 3.7 3.34 0.34 - 
Chemicals 0.46 0.42 0.35 0.34 
Processed Food 0.57 0.47 0.57 0.56 
Textiles 2.43 2.39 0.53 0.49 
Minerals 0.29 0.28 0.83 1.06 
Basic Manufactures 1.01 0.96 0.76 0.69 
Non-Electronic Machinery 0.52 0.52 0.82 0.84 
Fresh Food 0.77 0.68 0.69 0.80 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 1.59 1.48 1.08 1.07 
Transport Equipment 0.25 0.27 1.43 1.34 
Clothing 3.65 3.46 1.39 1.29 
Electronic Components 1.04 1.04 1.49 1.53 
IT & Consumer Electronics 2 2.43 1.81 1.75 
Note: The index measures China and Mexico’s revealed comparative advantage in exports according to 
the Balassa formula. The index compares the share of a given sector in national exports with the share of 
this sector in world exports.  Values above 1 indicate that the country specializes in the sector under 
review.  The terms in bold are the sectors in which China and Mexico compete most directly. 
Source: Intracen 
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 Mexico faces fierce competition from China, especially in the production of labor-
intensive manufactured goods.  According to the Balassa Index, China and Mexico both 
specialize in IT and consumer electronics, electronic components, clothing, and miscellaneous 
manufacturing.  Twelve of Mexico’s twenty most important economic sectors that export to the 
US face some competition or substantial competition from Chinese exporters.  These figures 
suggest that China could jeopardize Mexican exports in foreign markets. 
China can produce labor-intensive goods at a lower cost than Mexico can.  China has a 
more abundant labor force than Latin America; therefore, wages are four times lower in China 
than in Latin America.  Mexico cannot compete with China’s low labor costs.  As a result, 
Mexico is facing shrinking participation rates in export markets, especially to the US.  In fact, in 
2003, China replaced Mexico as the US’s second largest trading partner. 
 
Specialization in Latin America 
 
 Arg Bra Chi Col Mex Per Ven 
Wood Products 0.60 2.26 4.10 0.78 0.26 0.58 - 
Leather Products 1.98 2.88 - 0.93 - - - 
Chemicals 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.86 0.34 0.35 0.29 
Processed Food 6.6 2.93 2.53 1.49 0.56 4.13 0.16 
Textiles 0.20 0.60 0.17 0.71 0.49 0.68 - 
Minerals 1.75 1.05 1.67 3.63 1.06 2.56 7.54 
Basic Manufactures 0.75 1.60 3.66 1.04 0.69 2.86 1.09 
Non-Electronic Machinery 0.22 0.82 0.07 0 09 0.84 0.06 0.05 
Fresh Food 5.5 4.13 4.54 4.14 0.80 2.52 0.11 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.20 0.27 0.11 0.44 1.07 0.35 0.05 
Transport Equipment 0.45 0.88 0.08 0.10 1.34 - 0.15 
Clothing - 0 .12 - 1.48 1.29 2.81 - 
Electronic Components 0.05 0.20 - 0.12 1.53 - - 
IT & Consumer Electronics - 0.26 - - 1.75 - - 
Note: The index measures Latin American countries’ revealed comparative advantage in exports 
according to the Balassa formula. The index compares the share of a given sector in national exports with 
the share of this sector in world exports.  Values above 1 indicate that the country specializes in the sector 
under review.  The figures in bold represent those sectors in which Latin America is specialized and 
China is not.  The countries are (in order shown): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela. 
Source: Intracen 
 
 In the above table, the figures in bold represent the sectors in which Latin America is 
specialized and China is not: wood products, processed food, minerals, and perishable goods.  
These goods are clearly raw materials.  Latin America has a very strong commodity endowment; 
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it has the raw materials and natural resources that China needs to maintain its economic growth.  
As a result, Latin America exports predominantly primary products to China.  Many analysts 
have suggested that the complementarity between the Chinese and Latin American economies 
makes them “a match made in trade heaven” (Orozco 1).  Jiang Shixue of the Latin Business 
Chronicle said, “As China’s economy is growing so rapidly, it needs more inputs of resources 
and raw materials.  Latin America is the right partner China can rely on” (2). 
 
Latin America’s Primary Product Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports 
 
Year Arg Bra Chi Col Ecu Mex Pan Per Ven Total 
LA 
1970 86.1 86.6 95.2 91 98.2 66.7 96.4 98.2 99 89.1 
1975 75.6 74.5 87.5 79.2 97.8 67.5 95.3 97.1 99 83.7 
1980 76.9 62.9 88.7 80.3 97 87.9 91.1 83.1 98.5 82.2 
1985 79.2 56.3 93.3 83.1 99.2 79.4 87.2 88.2 90 76.4 
1990 70.9 48.1 89.1 74.9 97.7 56.7 83 81.6 89.1 66.8 
1995 66.1 46.9 86.8 65.8 92.4 22.5 79.7 86.5 85.8 50.1 
1996 69.9 46.9 85.7 70.2 91.4 22.3 79.7 85.7 88 50.6 
1997 65.7 46.9 84.8 69.3 91.3 19.3 82.6 85.1 86.3 47.9 
1998 65.1 45.8 83.1 67.9 89.6 14.8 82.7 80 81.5 42 
1999 68.2 46.3 83.5 69.6 91.1 14.9 83.5 83 88.3 41.1 
2000 67.6 42 84 65.9 89.9 16.5 84.1 83.1 90.9 41.8 
2001 67.4 46 82.2 60.6 88.1 14.9 86.9 81.4 88.8 40.9 
2002 69.5 47.4 83.2 62.2 89.7 15.7 88 83 86.2 41.2 
2003 72.2 48.5 83.8 65.7 88 18.6 88.9 83 87.3 44.3 
2004 71.2 47 86.8 63 90.7 20.2 90 83.1 86.9 46.4 
2005 69.3 47.3 86.3 65.3 91 23 90.9 85.3 90.6 50 
Note: The figures represent each Latin American country’s exports of primary products to the world as a 
percentage of the country’s total exports to the world.  The “Total LA” column refers to total Latin 
American primary product exports to the world as a percentage of total Latin American exports to the 
world.  The countries are (in order shown): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Source: ECLAC’s 2006 Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 
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Latin America's Primary Product Exports as a 
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Argentina's Primary Product Exports as a 
Percentage of its Total Exports
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Brazil's Primary Product Exports as a Percentage 
of its Total Exports
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Chile's Primary Product Exports as a Percentage 
of its Total Exports
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Colombia's Primary Product Exports as a 
Percentage of its Total Exports
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Mexico's Primary Product Exports as a 
Percentage of its Total Exports
0
5
10
15
20
25
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
%
 
o
f T
o
ta
l E
x
po
rt
s
 
Panama's Primary Product Exports as a 
Percentage of its Total Exports
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Peru's Primary Product Exports as a Percentage 
of its Total Exports
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Venezuela's Primary Product Exports as a 
Percentage of its Total Exports
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Source: ECLAC’s 2006 Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
 The above table and graphs show various Latin American countries’ exports of primary 
products to the world as a percentage of their total exports to the world.  From 1970 until the 
1990’s, most Latin American countries decreased their reliance on primary product exports.  For 
Latin America as a whole, primary product exports as a percentage of total exports decreased 
from 89.1 percent in 1970 to 40.9 percent in 2001.  Since 2000, however, primary products have 
made up a larger share of most Latin American countries’ total exports.  Most analysts agree that 
China’s large demand for raw materials and natural resources has led to a huge surge in Latin 
America’s exports of primary products, which has increased many countries’ primary product 
exports as a percentage of their total exports. 
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Latin American Countries’ Top 5 Export Sectors to China 
 
Argentina’s Top 5 Export Sectors to China: 
1. Agriculture and hunting 
2. Food, beverages, and tobacco 
3. Textiles, clothing, and leather 
4. Metal and metal products 
5. Chemicals and chemical products 
 
Brazil’s Top 5 Export Sectors to China: 
1. Agriculture and hunting 
2. Mining and quarrying 
3. Metal and metal products 
4. Wood and wood products 
5. Food, beverages, and tobacco 
 
Chile’s Top 5 Export Sectors to China: 
1. Metal and metal products 
2. Mining and quarrying 
3. Wood and wood products 
4. Food, beverages, and tobacco 
5. Chemicals and chemical products 
 
Colombia’s Top 5 Export Sectors to China: 
1. Metal and metal products 
2. Recycling 
3. Chemicals and chemical products 
4. Textiles, clothing, and leather 
5. Agriculture and hunting 
 
Ecuador’s Top 5 Export Sectors to China: 
1. Agriculture and hunting 
2. Petroleum 
3. Food, beverages, and tobacco 
4. Recycling 
5. Other manufacturing 
 
Mexico’s Top 5 Export Sectors to China: 
1. Electrical and electronic equipment 
2. Chemicals and chemical equipment 
3. Metal and metal products 
4. Motor vehicles, transport equipment 
5. Machinery and equipment 
 
Panama’s Top 5 Export Sectors to China: 
1. Petroleum 
2. Food, beverages, and tobacco 
3. Recycling 
4. Motor vehicles, transport equipment 
5. Electrical and electronic equipment 
 
Peru’s Top 5 Export Sectors to China:  
1. Food, beverages, and tobacco 
2. Mining and quarrying 
3. Metal and metal products 
4. Textiles, clothing, and leather 
5. Chemicals and chemical products
 
 
Source: Intracen 
Latin America’s Primary Product Exports to China 
 
Year Arg Bra Chi Col Ecu Mex Pan Per Ven Total 
LA 
1995 67 76.9 97.8 92.5 99.8 13.1 - 98.1 - 78.3 
1996 84.9 78.4 98.7 50.7 100 22.4 100 99.4 - 79.4 
1997 81.9 83.4 98.9 73.2 100 12.4 91.3 98.1 - 82.7 
1998 77.2 86.7 98.7 79.5 99.9 7.7 99.7 96.4 - 79.9 
1999 73.5 83.9 98.2 70 98.4 5.4 96.4 99.6 64.3 80.1 
2000 81 81.3 98.8 70 98.9 6.6 100 99.6 77 82.7 
2001 80.7 74.2 98.6 66.9 94.8 7.6 99.6 99.4 80.8 78.7 
2002 74.5 77.1 98.8 51 89.1 6.2 98.7 99.3 45 76.1 
2003 88.1 67.9 97.8 39.7 94.5 8 99.4 99.2 49.3 76 
2004 90.3 79.6 99.7 32 97.5 22.6 97.8 99.4 45.1 83.9 
2005 92.2 80.4 - - - 40 - - - - 
Note: The figures represent each Latin American country’s exports of primary products to China as a 
percentage of the country’s total exports to China.  The “Total LA” column refers to total Latin American 
primary product exports to China as a percentage of total Latin American exports to China.  The countries 
are (in order shown): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and 
Venezuela. 
Source: ECLAC’s Division of International Trade and Integration  
 
 With the exception of Mexico and Central America, Latin America exports 
predominantly primary products to China.  On average, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
Panama, and Peru rely on primary products for over 75 percent of their exports to China.  Within 
this group of countries, the figures are even more remarkable; for Chile, Panama, and Peru, 
primary products account for almost 100 percent of their exports to China.  Many analysts have 
said that China’s strong demand for raw materials and natural resources is beneficial for Latin 
America since it has led to a huge surge in the region’s exports and has pushed up commodity 
prices in the world market.  Other analysts, however, are concerned that China is pushing Latin 
America into a “raw materials corner.”  The above figures seem to support this claim.  The risks 
associated with the “raw materials corner” are highlighted in the next section. 
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Latin America’s Manufactures Imports from China 
 
Year Arg Bra Chi Col Ecu Mex Pan Per Ven Total 
LA 
1995 91.7 63.7 95.8 68.1 79.8 68.6 88 94.4 91.7 83.2 
1996 88.6 81.4 96.2 67.9 81.3 60.2 83 95.9 88.6 84.5 
1997 89.9 79.7 96.2 69.5 82.1 74.3 85.7 79.6 89.9 84.9 
1998 89.3 76 96.4 72.6 82.6 75.6 84 81.8 89.3 84.4 
1999 90.4 76.5 95.7 75.1 84.8 70.6 75.9 82.8 90.4 83.7 
2000 89.7 76.1 95.6 79.3 84.8 64.1 82.6 83.9 89.7 84.4 
2001 88 74.1 94.8 84.3 89.4 69.6 86.5 87.5 88 86.2 
2002 64.2 70.5 94.7 85.8 90.4 76.6 87.2 85.4 64.2 86.4 
2003 76.7 71.2 93.7 85.8 92.8 72.6 89.2 75 76.7 88 
2004 79.5 78.1 93.7 87.5 91.6 - 90.4 84.5 79.5 88.5 
2005 81 84.4 - - 91.8 - - - 81 - 
Note: The figures represent each Latin American country’s manufactures imports from China as a 
percentage of the country’s total imports from China.  The “Total LA” column refers to total Latin 
American manufactures imports from China as a percentage of total Latin American imports from China.  
The countries are (in order shown): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
and Venezuela. 
Source: ECLAC’s Division of International Trade and Integration  
 
 China has a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactured goods because of its 
low labor costs.  Latin America is importing more and more of these cheap manufactured goods, 
including electronics, textiles, clothing, footwear, and toys.  Since 1995, manufactured goods 
have made up 85 percent of Latin America’s imports from China on average.  Several analysts 
have said that the import of Chinese manufactured products competes with and undercuts local 
Latin American industries.  China has already made deep inroads into markets in Mexico and 
Central America, and more recently, in Brazil and Argentina.  The implications of these trade 
patterns are discussed in the next section. 
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Latin America’s Terms of Trade Indices for Goods 
 
Year Arg Bra Chi Col Ecu Mex Pan Per Ven Total 
LA 
1980 99.1 85.5 78.8 114.7 79.0 98.8 101.0 123.3 107.9 99.0 
1985 86.7 73.6 57.5 108.9 76.9 89.5 100.8 130.7 105.1 88.9 
1990 84.7 77.7 95.8 77.8 76.7 83.0 105.3 102.0 72.6 84.9 
1995 96.0 107.6 102.1 84.2 72.7 83.1 102.6 107.2 56.6 89.8 
1996 103.5 107.1 89.4 84.3 80.5 90.8 105.5 104.9 67.1 92.8 
1997 102.2 113.6 94.5 93.3 89.1 89.5 103.9 115.5 70.1 95.0 
1998 96.6 111.9 91.0 81.2 75.8 90.6 104.7 103.4 51.2 91.3 
1999 90.9 97.0 94.2 87.2 89.1 99.3 104.6 100.8 66.1 94.4 
2000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
2001 99.3 99.6 93.3 94.2 84.6 97.4 102.7 95.6 82.2 96.3 
2002 98.7 98.4 97.2 92.5 86.8 97.9 101.6 98.4 87.6 96.6 
2003 107.2 97.0 102.8 95.2 89.8 98.8 97.2 102.2 98.7 98.6 
2004 109.2 97.9 124.9 108.5 91.5 101.6 95.3 111.3 118.1 103.9 
2005 106.9 99.2 139.8 117.7 102.4 103.6 93.5 119.4 154.4 109.1 
Note: Base year 2000 
Source: ECLAC’s 2006 Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 
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 Latin America’s terms of trade are measured by taking the ratio of the price index of its 
exports to the price index of its imports.  Generally, since 2001, Latin America has experienced 
improving terms of trade.  In particular, Chile’s terms of trade improved tremendously from 93.3 
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in 2001 to 139.8 in 2005.  Analysts attribute the improvement in terms of trade largely to China’s 
strong demand for primary products, which has increased commodity prices in the world market.  
As a result, the prices of Latin America’s commodity exports have risen.  In addition, Latin 
America’s imports of manufactured goods from China are relatively cheap.  This combination of 
higher export prices and lower import prices is largely responsible for the terms of trade 
improvement that Latin America has experienced in the last six years.  
 
PART SIX: CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA: DEPENDENCY RELOADED? 
Many of the issues and questions addressed by the Latin American dependency theorists 
of the 1960’s and 1970’s are relevant to current Sino-Latin American trade relations.  In this 
section, I focus mainly on the trade-related aspects of dependency developed by Raúl Prebisch, 
and less on the political and social aspects.  In the 1960’s, Prebisch and the ECLA argued that 
the world economy was divided into the industrial “center” and the commodity-producing 
“periphery.”  The poor Latin American countries of the periphery exported mostly commodities 
and raw materials to the advanced countries.  The center then manufactured products from those 
commodities and raw materials and sold them back to the poorer nations.  With Hans Singer, 
Prebisch claimed that the terms of trade for the commodity exporters tended to deteriorate over 
time.  Prebisch, therefore, concluded that reliance on primary product exports is not conducive to 
economic growth. 
Current Sino-Latin American trade relations resemble in some ways the center-periphery 
relationship outlined by Prebisch.  Latin America, with the exception of Mexico and the Central 
American countries, exports commodities and raw materials to China, and imports cheap 
manufactured goods from China.  In 2004, primary products made up 83.9 percent of Latin 
America’s exports to China, and manufactured goods accounted for 88.5 percent of Latin 
America’s imports from China.  Primary products make up more than 75 percent of Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru’s exports to China.  In fact, from 1995 to 2004, 
primary products accounted on average for more than 97 percent of Chile, Ecuador, Panama, and 
Peru’s exports to China.  As a result of China’s increased demand for natural resources and raw 
materials, primary products are beginning to make up an increasingly larger share of Latin 
America’s total exports. 
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According to Prebisch, countries that export mainly commodities should experience 
deteriorating terms of trade over time.  Current data, however, suggests that Latin America is 
experiencing improving terms of trade.  There are several factors that explain this phenomenon.  
China’s large demand for resources and raw materials has pushed up commodity prices in the 
world market.  In addition, Latin America imports relatively cheap manufactured goods from 
China.  As a result, Latin America’s commodity exporters are enjoying improving terms of trade 
(Shixue 2).  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently said, however, that commodity 
prices are unusually high and forecasted that non-fuel commodity prices will decrease 
throughout 2007 (Oppenheimer, “Slowdown” 1).  The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has not yet 
materialized in Latin America, but if the IMF’s predictions are correct and primary product 
prices fall, the region may witness deteriorating terms of trade. 
There are other risks associated with Latin America’s current trade relationship with 
China besides deteriorating terms of trade.  Many analysts have warned that the current raw 
materials bonanza that is driving up the prices of Latin America’s commodity exports makes the 
region vulnerable to “Dutch disease.”  This phenomenon occurs when a commodity boom leads 
to strengthened or sometimes overvalued currency that then causes the prices of manufactured 
goods to rise.  The higher manufactures prices make it more difficult for the manufacturing 
sectors to compete in export markets (Trinh, Voss, and Dyck 12).  “Dutch disease,” therefore, 
threatens to complicate the development of Latin America’s manufacturing sectors.  If Latin 
America experiences “Dutch disease,” the region’s growth prospects could be highly damaged. 
Other analysts are concerned that China’s increased demand for raw materials has caused 
an excessive reallocation toward natural resource-based industries in Latin America, and has 
pushed the region into a “raw materials corner” (Blázquez-Lidoy, Rodríguez, and Santiso 26).  
Sino-Latin American trade data seems to confirm this claim.  For example, in 2005, copper 
accounted for 43 percent of Chile’s exports to China; iron ore and soybeans made up 26 percent 
and 25 percent of Brazil’s exports to China respectively; and, soybeans made up almost 55 
percent of Argentina’s exports to China.  Some analysts predict that Latin American countries 
will specialize even deeper, and dependence on a small range of commodities will increase 
(Jubany and Poon 4).  Deep specialization in primary products makes Latin American countries 
more susceptible to negative price or weather-related shocks, and potential trade gains are 
limited to a few items.  In addition, any slowdown in the Chinese economy could severely 
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impact Latin America by decreasing the volume of its exports and by causing a decrease in 
commodity prices (Buck 8). 
International bodies are also worried that Latin America is becoming excessively reliant 
on primary product exports.  During the 2006 Latin Economic Forum, an Argentine expert said 
that if Latin America’s economic ties with China do not undergo a structural change, the region 
will be unable to meet the Millennium Development Goals.  Graciela Chichilnisky, director of 
Columbia University’s Center for Risk Management, admitted that China’s emergence presents a 
historic opportunity for Latin America, but warned that Latin America should be worried.  She 
said: 
On the other hand, the current historical circumstances make it necessary for these 
countries to stop specializing in exports of natural resources and to enter the knowledge 
economy…Exporting commodities is a bad foundation for development, and is an 
unsustainable policy.  There are two regions of the world that have failed to grow since 
World War II: Africa and Latin America—the two that have specialized in commodities.  
That is not a coincidence. (Seligman 1) 
Those at the April 2006 meeting agreed that opportunities for exporting raw materials are better 
than ever for Latin America, but the boom “is actually the worst thing that could happen” 
(Seligman 2) because it threatens Latin America’s long-term economic growth. 
 In 2005, the United Nations reported that Latin America’s natural abundance of natural 
resources has not been a blessing, but an obstacle to the region’s economic development.  The 
2005 U.N. Human Development Report called it “the resource curse” (Oppenheimer, “Curse” 1).  
According to the report, Latin America is lagging behind because it depends heavily on primary 
product exports, rather than developing more sophisticated export industries that are more 
profitable in today’s knowledge-based economy.  The report said that those countries that depend 
heavily on exports of natural resources and raw materials “are on the downward escalator” 
(Oppenheimer, “Curse” 1).  In the report’s conclusion, the U.N. predicted that unless Latin 
American countries change their current status as exporters of raw materials, they will not reach 
the current development levels of high-income countries until the year 2177 (Oppenheimer, 
“Curse” 2). 
 While few analysts have used the term “dependency,” many have implied that China is 
pushing Latin America into the peripheral commodity-producing role.  Andres Oppenheimer 
admits that China’s emergence as a massive buyer of Latin America’s raw materials is a major 
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reason for the region’s best three-year growth period in recent history, but he does not believe 
that current Sino-Latin American trade patterns are beneficial for Latin America in the long-run.  
He doubts China will buy more sophisticated goods from Latin America to help the region 
develop its manufacturing industries.  He says, “China’s interest in the region is mainly as a 
supplier of raw materials, which threatens to condemn many Latin American countries to remain 
extraction economies, much like what they were 200 years ago” (“Coming headache” 1).  Daron 
Acemoglu et al. made a similar point in “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An 
Empirical Investigation,” when they said that Latin America was colonized as an extractive 
colony and has remained an extractive economy even today.   
 In Oppenheimer’s article “India will be big player in Latin America,” he compares India 
and China’s increased trade with Latin America.  In the article, Abdul Nafei, head of the Latin 
American studies program at Jawhardal Nehru University, says, “While China reminds me of 
16th century Spain, which was only interested in extracting Latin America’s natural resources, 
India is never going to be an imperial country” (Oppenheimer, “India” 2).  Again, this is very 
similar to Acemoglu et al.’s point that Spain colonized Latin America for extractive purposes, 
and the region remains an extractive economy today.  Mohan Malik, professor at the Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security Studies, warns that Sino-Latin American trade relations are beginning to 
resemble a dependent relationship.  He says: 
In a classic re-run of the trade relations established by European colonial powers, Latin 
Americans (and Africans) export raw materials to China while importing cheap Chinese 
products which compete with, and undercut, local industries.  Many Latin American 
economists and analysts warn against falling into the trap of being a supplier of 
commodities for China’s value-added manufacturing enterprises, and thus assume the 
posture of a Chinese colony or economic dependency. (4) 
 While few analysts or writers have even mentioned dependency in their discussion of 
Sino-Latin American trade, almost all have suggested ways in which Latin America can avoid 
the “raw materials corner.”  Trinh, Voss, and Dyck say that the goal of Latin American 
commodity exporters should be to use the commodity windfall to develop sectors that involve a 
higher degree of value addition.  If such structural changes are not made, increased trade with 
China will only provide short-term gains.  Long-term gains from increased Sino-Latin American 
trade will depend on the ability of Latin American countries to translate the commodity windfall 
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into sustainable development, more jobs, and declining poverty.  This could be achieved through 
investment in education, infrastructure, and poverty alleviation (Trinh Voss, and Dyck 9). 
 Several analysts have suggested that Latin America needs to capitalize on the commodity 
windfall in a more active way by moving towards value-added industries.  By producing value-
added goods from its raw materials, Latin America can reduce its exposure to terms of trade 
shocks (Buck 9).  China’s success should stimulate Latin America toward active strategies that 
provide incentives to diversify and increase the technological sophistication of its domestic 
production (Devlin, Estevadeordal, and Rodríguez 214).  IMF director Rodrigo de Rato says, 
“Latin America still depends a lot on raw materials for economic growth.  It requires greater 
integration of manufacturing and industry and there is a need for greater foreign investments” 
(Oppenheimer, “Slowdown” 1).  Oppenheimer welcomes a fall in commodity prices, even if it 
causes an economic slowdown in Latin America.  He says, “If economic deceleration turns into a 
wake-up call for the region to reduce its addiction to raw materials and helps its leaders realize 
that long-term growth comes from attracting investments and producing more sophisticated 
goods, long live the coming slowdown!  It may help bring some Latin American countries back 
to the real world” (“Slowdown” 2).    
 Some economists and analysts claim that dependency is dead, but many of the trade-
related aspects of dependency are relevant to Latin America’s current relationship with China.  
Latin America has assumed the role of the periphery, exporting natural resources and raw 
materials to China, while China has assumed the core or center position, exporting manufactured 
goods to the region.  Several Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Panama, and Peru are being pushed into a “raw materials corner;” they rely on primary 
products for at least 75 percent of their total exports to China.  In the 1960’s, Prebisch and the 
ECLA were concerned that Latin America’s reliance on primary product exports threatened the 
region’s economic development and manufacturing sectors, and those worries still exist today.   
 Recalling Dos Santos’s definition of dependency, he said, “[Dependence] can have either 
a positive or a negative effect on [Latin America’s] immediate development.”  So far, China’s 
economic growth has created mostly positive effects for Latin America.  Most Latin American 
countries have witnessed a tremendous increase in their exports to China, and several countries 
have recently registered record trade surpluses due to this surge in exports.  China’s increased 
demand for raw materials and natural resources has pushed up commodity prices in the world 
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market.  As a result, the prices of Latin America’s commodity exports have risen.  In addition, 
Latin America imports cheap manufactured goods from China.  This combination of higher 
commodity prices and lower manufactures prices is largely responsible for Latin America’s 
improving terms of trade.   
Increased Sino-Latin American trade has generated mostly positive effects for Latin 
America, but experts at the 2007 World Economic Forum said that the “trade honeymoon” 
between the two regions cannot last forever.  If China’s economy slows down or if China’s 
demand for primary products falls and causes a subsequent drop in primary product prices, trade 
with China may no longer be as beneficial for Latin America as it has been.  Based on Dos 
Santos’s definition, Latin America’s development, whether positive or negative, has become 
somewhat dependent on China’s growth and development.   
In this paper, I focused mostly on the trade-related aspects of dependency.  In future 
research, I hope to explore the other aspects of dependency theory that are relevant to Latin 
America’s current relationship with China.  For example, China has been investing heavily in 
Latin American infrastructure and logistics, and I hope to research the significance of this 
investment using a dependency framework.  Some dependency theorists said that social 
inequality in the dependent nation tends to increase over time.  I plan to investigate whether 
social inequality in Latin America is growing as a result of increased trade with China.  Latin 
America’s relationship with China has clearly sparked some of the same questions and issues 
addressed by the Latin American dependency theorists of the 1960’s and 1970’s, demonstrating 
that dependency can still be a useful framework for understanding Latin America’s trade 
relations and economic development.  
 
WORKS CITED 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. “The colonial origins of  
comparative development: An empirical investigation.” The American Economic Review 
91.5 (2001): 1369-1401. 
 
Angotti, Thomas. “The Political Implications of Dependency Theory.” Latin American  
 Perspectives 8.3 (1981): 124-137. 
 
Barrionuevo, Alexei. “China’s Appetites Lead to Changes in its Trade Diet.” New York Times  
6 April 2007. <http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article? 
res=F00F11FD3C5B0C758CDDAD0894DF404482#> 
 52 
Blázquez-Lidoy, Jorge, Javier Rodríguez, and Javier Santiso. “Angel or Devil? China’s Trade  
Impact on Latin American Emerging Markets.” Working Paper No. 252. Paris: OECD 
Development Centre, June 2006. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/3/37054336.pdf> 
 
“Brazil exports 36 pct of China’s list of imports.” MacauHub 9 January 2007. 
 <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/news.php?ID=2648> 
 
“Brazil faces trade deficit with China.” Taipei Times 2 April 2007.  
 <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/worldbiz/archives/2007/04/02/2003354957> 
 
Brewer, Anthony. Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey. London: Routledge &  
Kegan Paul, 1980. 
 
Buck, Karl. “China’s Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Expectations and Bad  
Dreams.” Working Paper. Geneva: The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, December 2006. 
 
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development in Latin America.  
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979. 
 
Chilcote, Ronald H. “Dependency: A Critical Synthesis of the Literature.” Latin American  
 Perspectives 1.1 (1974): 4-29. 
 
“Chinese exports to Brazil reach record in March.” MacauHub 3 April 2007. 
 <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/news.php?ID=3108> 
 
Chirot, Daniel and Thomas D. Hall. “World-System Theory.” Annual Review of Sociology  
8 (1982): 81-106. 
 
Devlin, Robert, Antoni Estevadeordal, and Andres Rodriguez, eds. The Emergence of China:  
 Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  
 2006. 
 
Dominguez, Jorge L. “China’s Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric  
Hopes.” Working Paper. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue, June 2006. 
<http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/2006/summer/china.pdf> 
 
Dos Santos, Theotonio. “The Structure of Dependence.” The American Economic Review 60.2  
 (1970): 231-236. 
 
---. “The Theoretical Foundations of the Cardoso Government: A New Stage of the Dependency- 
 Theory Debate.” Latin American Perspectives 25.1 (1998): 53-70. 
 
Dumbaugh, Kerry and Mark P. Sullivan. “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America.”  
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. Washington, D.C.: The Library of 
Congress, April 2005. <http://www.usis.it/pdf/other/RS22119.pdf> 
 53 
Ferraro, Vincent. “Dependency Theory: An Introduction.” Lecture. Mount Holyoke College,  
 July 1996. <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm> 
 
Frank, André Gunder. “The Development of Underdevelopment.” Monthly Review 17 (1966):  
 17-31. 
 
Ho, Xuan-Trang. “China’s Burgeoning Role in Latin America: A Threat to the US?” Political  
Affairs Magazine 24 February 2005. 
<http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/712/1/78/> 
 
Jenkins, Rhys, Enrique Dussel Peters, and Mauricio Mesquita Moreira. “The Economic Impact  
 of China on Latin America: An Agenda for Research.” Working Paper. St. Petersburg:  
 Seventh Annual Global Development Conference, Pre-Conference Workshop on Asian  
 and Other Drivers of Global Change, January 2006. 
 
Johnson, Stephen. “Balancing China’s Growing Influence in Latin America.” Backgrounder No.  
1888. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, October 2005. 
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/bg1888.cfm> 
 
Jubany, Florencia and Daniel Poon. “China and Latin America: Historic Opportunity.” Latin  
 Business Chronicle 14 August 2006.  
<http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=224> 
 
Krugman, Paul and Maurice Obstfeld. International Economics: Theory and Policy. 7th ed.  
Boston: Addison Wesley, 2005. 
 
Malik, Mohan. “China’s Growing Involvement in Latin America.” PINR: Power and Interest  
 News Report 12 June 2006.  
 <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=508&language_id=1> 
 
Mitchell, Derek and Chietigj Bajpaee. “China and Latin America.” Working Paper. Washington,  
 D.C.: The CSIS International Security Program, July 2006.  
 <http://www.chinabalancesheet.org/Documents/Paper_Latin_America.PDF> 
 
Munck, Ronaldo. “Dependency and Imperialism in the New Times: A Latin American  
 Perspective.” The European Journal of Development Research 11.1 (1999): 56-74. 
 
Oppenheimer, Andres. “The coming headache: trade deficits with China.” The Miami Herald  
30 July 2006. <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmtmh/is_200607/ai_n16603248> 
 
---. “India will be big player in Latin America.” The Miami Herald 22 January 2007. 
 <http://www.realcities.com/mld/miamiherald/news/columnists/andres_oppenheimer/ 
16515477.htm> 
 
---. “Latin America: Region’s economic slowdown may be good news.” The Miami Herald  
15 April 2007. <http://www.miamiherald.com/421/v-print/story/74192.html> 
 54 
---. “U.N.: Latin America suffers from natural resources ‘curse.’” The Miami Herald 
8 September 2005. 
<http://www.mywire.com/pubs/MiamiHerald/2005/09/08/996018?&pbl=10> 
 
Orozco, Jose. “Latin America’s Chinese wake-up call.” Asia Times 11 October 2006.  
 < http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HJ11Cb01.html> 
 
Petras, James. “Dependency and World System Theory: A Critique and New Directions.” Latin  
 American Perspectives 8.3 (1981): 148-155. 
 
Ray, David. “The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic  
 Fallacies.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 15.1 (1973): 4-20. 
 
Sánchez, Omar. “The Rise and Fall of the Dependency Movement: Does it Inform  
Underdevelopment Today?” Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe 
14.2 (2003). <http://www.tau.ac.il/eial/XIV_2/sanchez.html> 
 
Santiso, Javier. “China: A Helping Hand for Latin America?” Policy Insight No. 23. Paris:  
OECD  Development Centre, June 2006. 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/13/37293128.pdf> 
 
Seligman, Felipe. “Latin America: China’s Appetite for Commodities, a Blessing or a Curse?”  
 Inter Pres Service News Agency 21 April 2006.  
 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/3/37054336.pdf> 
 
Shixue, Jiang. “China’s Latin American Perspective.” Latin Business Chronicle 9 August 2006. 
 <www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=225> 
 
Topik, Steven. “Dependency Revisited: Saving the Baby from the Bathwater.” Latin American  
 Perspectives 25.6 (1998): 95-99. 
 
Trinh, Tamara, Silja Voss, and Steffen Dyck. “China’s commodity hunger: Implications for  
 Africa and Latin America.” Deutche Bank Research 13 June 2006. 
 <www.dbresearch.com> 
 
Tyler, William G. and J. Peter Wogart. “Economic Dependence and Marginalization: Some  
Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 15.1 (1973): 
36-45. 
 
“Up for Debate: Dependencia and Protectionism in Hindsight.” The Commanding Heights on  
 PBS. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/ufd_ 
dependencia_full.html> 
 
Yergin, Daniel A. and Joseph Stanislaw. The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World  
 Economy. New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 2002. 
